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Abstract
Automated investment managers, or robo-advisors, have emerged as an alternative to traditional
financial advisors. Their viability crucially depends on timely communication of information from the
clients they serve. We introduce and develop a novel human-machine interaction framework, in which the
robo-advisor solves an adaptive mean-variance control problem, with the risk-return tradeoff dynamically
updated based on the risk profile communicated by the client. Our model predicts that clients who value
a personalized portfolio are more suitable for robo-advising. Clients who place higher emphasis on
delegation and clients with a risk profile that changes frequently benefit less from robo-advising.
1 Introduction
Automated investment managers, commonly referred to as robo-advisors, have gained widespread popularity
in recent years. The value of assets under management by robo-advisors is the highest in the United States,
exceeding $440 billion in 2019 (Backend Benchmarking [2019]). Major robo-advising firms include Vanguard
Personal Advisor Services, which manages about $140 billion of assets, Schwab Intelligent Portfolios, with
over $40 billion of assets, Wealthfront, with about $20 billion of assets, and Betterment, with about $18
billion of assets under management. The popularity of robo-advisors is also growing in other parts of the
world. They manage more than $30 billion in Europe (Statista [2019]) and are rapidly growing in Asia
and emerging markets (Burnmark [2017]). According to Abraham et al. [2019], the value of assets under
management by robo-advisors is expected to grow at an average annual rate of over 30 percent, reaching an
estimated $1.5 trillion by 2023, solely in the United States.
The first robo-advisors available to the general public were launched in 2008, in the wake of the financial
crisis and the ensuing loss of trust in established financial services institutions. To begin with, firms rooted
in the technology industry began offering a range of digital financial tools directly to customers, including
investment analysis tools, previously only available to financial professionals (FINRA [2016]). Examples of
such pioneering robo-advising firms include the now established firms Betterment and Wealthfront. Later
on, industry incumbents, such as Vanguard and Charles Schwab, followed suit and began offering their
own robo-advising services. This rise of robo-advising since the financial crisis has also undoubtedly been
compounded by the seismic shift towards passive investing and exchange-traded funds.1
Existing robo-advising systems are based on a one-time interaction with the client. For instance, Van-
guard Personal Advisor Services profiles the client based on input received at the outset, which includes
financial goals, investment horizon and demographic information. After the investment plan proposed by
the robo-advisor is accepted by the client, the robo-advisor autonomously executes trades to reach the desired
portfolio allocation (Rossi and Utkus [2019a]). Another popular robo-advising firm, Wealthfront, estimates
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the client’s subjective risk tolerance by asking whether her objective is to maximize gains, minimize losses,
or a mix of the two. The robo-advisor uses the client’s answers to construct a risk parameter which may also
depend on additional objective risk indicators, and then solves a mean-variance optimization problem (Lam
[2016]). However, with limited or no interaction with the client in the process, the robo-advisor is clearly
susceptible to the risk of making decisions based on stale information and, thus, not acting for the client’s
best interest.2
The distinguishing feature of our framework is that the client and the robo-advisor interact not only at
the beginning, but also throughout the investment period. The client wishes to optimally invest her wealth
throughout a finite horizon in a discrete market setting. She delegates this task to the robo-advisor, which
executes the investment on the client’s behalf, accounting for the evolving nature of her risk profile. In order
to effectively tailor the investment advice to the needs of the client, the robo-advisor solicits, on a regular
basis, information about the client’s changing risk preferences. At the beginning of the investment process,
the client specifies a desired rate of participation, which determines the frequency of her interaction with
the robo-advisor. At each interaction time, the client communicates her risk-preferences to the robo-advisor.
From that point, and until the subsequent time of interaction, the robo-advisor uses a random walk model
to describe the (unobserved) evolution of the client’s risk preferences. The random walk model captures the
fact that while the client’s risk preferences may change over time (Guiso et al. [2018]), they are unlikely to
exhibit drastic changes over a short time period (Schildberg-Horisch [2018]). The volatility of the random
walk quantifies how likely the client’s risk preferences are to change from the ones reported at the most
recent interaction with the robo-advisor.
The robo-advisor adopts a multi-period mean-variance optimization criterion. Unlike other risk averse
optimization problems considered in the literature, the risk-return tradeoff coefficient is stochastic and con-
sists of two components, one specific to the client and one specific to the robo-advisor. The client-specific
component incorporates the most recently communicated risk preferences of the client. This component is
updated only when the robo-advisor solicits the client’s input, and its dynamics are described by a finite
state Markov chain, whose transition times coincide with the times of interaction between the client and the
robo-advisor. The component specific to the robo-advisor, i.e., machine-specific, reflects the robo-advisor’s
aversion to uncertainty in the client’s risk preferences. The robo-advisor is less willing to take risk on behalf
of the client if the client’s risk preferences are based on stale information, resulting in the risk-return tradeoff
coefficient being inflated to a degree determined by the level of distrust in the most recently communicated
risk preferences. This is related to the concept of trust in Gennaioli and Vishny [2015], who show that
individuals without finance expertise are more willing to take on risk with a financial advisor they trust,
with trust based, for example, on personal relationships and good reputation. In their setting, the roles of
the client and the financial advisor are reversed compared to our model: the client’s baseline risk aversion
in a mean-variance criterion is inflated by a factor representing the client’s level of anxiety from bearing risk
with the financial advisor.
We study in detail the underlying optimization problem solved by the robo-advisor. We highlight how
both components of the risk-return tradeoff coefficient influence the optimal portfolio strategy, as well as
how the Markov chain transition probabilities link the optimal allocations before and after risk preferences
are communicated by the client. At each time point, the optimal allocation depends on the future path
of the client’s risk preferences. Their distribution depends on the client-specific component of the risk-
return tradeoff, which incorporates the most recently communicated risk profile of the client. With frequent
interaction, information about the client’s risk preferences arrives gradually, so there is little variation in
the client-specific component between consecutive times of interaction. This, in turn, translates into little
uncertainty in near-term optimal allocations. However, this allocation uncertainty increases with less frequent
interaction, as the random walk model is allowed to evolve “unchecked” over longer periods. Hence, prior to
each interaction time, at which the client again communicates her risk preferences, the subsequent optimal
allocation (i.e., the optimal allocation at the interaction time) will have a larger variance compared to the
case of more frequent updating. Between consecutive times of interaction, the robo-advisor makes investment
decisions based on stale information. Based on its level of uncertainty aversion, it then uses the machine-
2The Monetary Authority of Singapore issued a consultation paper on the regulation of robo-advisor services (MAS [2017]).
This includes requirements on the standard of governance and management oversight, and the responsibility of the board and
senior management for the monitoring and control of algorithms that process information and generate investment recommen-
dations. See also FINRA [2016].
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specific component of the risk-return tradeoff to tilt the optimal portfolio towards a less risky composition.
We obtain an explicit expression for the magnitude of this effect, and show that it corresponds to setting the
risk-return coefficient to a fixed percentile of the distribution of the client’s unknown risk aversion. In this
way, the robo-advisor controls the probability of choosing a portfolio composition that is too risky, given the
client’s most recently communicated risk preferences.
Another important modeling element is a measure of client regret, which quantifies the investment im-
plications of the evolving information asymmetry between the client and the robo-advisor. At each point in
time, the regret is equal to the expected change in portfolio allocation that would be realized if the robo-
advisor knew the client’s actual risk preferences. The regret is determined by the client’s participation rate
in the investment process and increases as time elapses since the most recent interaction between the client
and the robo-advisor. Moreover, the regret is increasing in the volatility of the random walk that describes
the client’s risk preferences; for a given volatility level, the regret is higher if the client communicated a low
risk aversion in her latest interaction with the robo-advisor.
We demonstrate how the robo-advisor can calibrate a threshold updating rule, based on expected changes
in the client’s risk aversion, in order to maintain a target level of regret for the client.3 Specifically, the robo-
advisor solicits the client’s risk preferences as soon as the expected change in her risk aversion, since the last
interaction, breaches a certain threshold. The threshold value depends on the client’s current risk profile
and adjusts to changes in her risk profile. For instance, if the client’s risk preferences shift to a level where
fluctuations are more likely to occur, then more frequent interaction is required (i.e., a lower threshold). We
investigate the benefits of such personalized service, where the mechanism triggering interaction is tailored
to the client’s current risk profile. In particular, we compare it to one-size-fits-all updating rules that are
tailored to properties of the “average client”. In the latter case, we show that clients with a risk profile that
is underrepresented in the robo-advisor’s client body have a higher regret than clients with a common risk
profile.
We use our measure of regret to study the suitability of a robo-advisor for a client who trades off low
regret with low personal involvement in the investment process. This tradeoff is determined by the client’s
frequency of interaction with the robo-advisor. Our model indicates that clients who desire a personalized
portfolio strategy (i.e., low regret) are more suitable for robo-advising than clients who prefer a high level
of delegation to the robo-advisor (i.e., infrequent interaction). These findings are consistent with empirical
evidence provided most recently by Rossi and Utkus [2019b]. We also find that clients with a highly volatile
risk profile are less suited for robo-advising. Such clients typically have specific or complex needs, and
would require a dedicated human service, rather than robo-advising which is better suited for clients with a
conventional risk profile (see, e.g., Phoon and Koh [2018]).
The robo-advising framework proposed herein is an interaction system between a human (the client)
and a machine (the robo-advisor). The analysis of this human-machine interaction system presents a novel
methodological contribution. Furthermore, the model we propose gives rise to a novel, and rather challenging,
adaptive control problem in which the system being controlled always maintains the same dynamics, but the
optimality criterion changes at random interaction times between the human and the machine. Specifically,
the dynamics of the tradeoff coefficient in the mean-variance criterion adapts to information communicated
by the human to the machine. This contrasts with existing literature in adaptive control (see, for instance,
Astrom and Wittenmark [1989]), where the optimality criterion always stays the same, and the system
dynamics adapt to incoming changes in the environment. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time
that such an adaptive control problem is being considered.
In our framework, the interaction times effectively divide the time interval from initiation and until the
terminal date into subperiods, triggering a new optimization problem at each interaction time. This yields
a sequence of time-inconsistent problems that are interlinked, because they all share the same terminal
date. Notably, at each time, the optimal control depends on the future evolution of the risk-return tradeoff
coefficient, until the terminal date, which in turn depends on the system dynamics and the frequency of
interaction between the human and the machine.
3With regret defined in terms of portfolio allocation, this amounts to triggering an update when the expected change in
portfolio allocation hits a given threshold. This is analogous to how robo-advisor algorithms trigger portfolio rebalancing as
soon as the portfolio composition has drifted sufficiently from the optimal composition (Kaya [2017]), except that here the
client’s risk preferences are changing rather than market prices of securities.
3
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly review related literature. In
Section 3, we introduce the main components of our modeling framework. In Section 4, we present the
optimal solution to the investment problem. In Section 5, we introduce and study performance metrics for
the human-machine interaction framework, and in Section 6 we discuss the calibration of this framework.
Section 7 contains concluding remarks and future directions along which the model we propose herein can be
extended. Appendix A contains technical results that are used throughout the paper. Appendix B contains
the proofs of the main results in Section 4. All remaining proofs are deferred to Appendix C. Appendix D
provides a pseudocode for the algorithm to compute the optimal investment strategies in Section 4.
2 Literature Review
The main contribution of our paper is the development of a novel framework that captures the symbiotic
nature of the investment process, in which the robo-advisor not only manages a portfolio of behalf of the
client but also repeatedly interacts with her to elicit her risk preferences through time.
Methodologically, our work contributes to the literature on time-inconsistent stochastic control (Bjo¨rk
and Murgoci [2013] and Bjo¨rk et al. [2014]). Other related works include Li and Ng [2010] who solve a
multi-period version of the classical Markowitz problem, and Basak and Chabakauri [2010] who solve a
continuous-time version of the dynamic mean-variance optimization problem within a potentially incomplete
market. A recent study of Dai et al. [2019] develops a dynamic mean-variance framework, in which the
investor specifies her target expected return only at inception. The authors obtain explicit formulas for
time-consistent policies under stochastic volatility and time-varying Gaussian returns. In all of these works,
the risk-return tradeoff is assumed to be constant throughout the investment horizon. By contrast, in our
model, the risk-return tradeoff is stochastic, and only observed by the controller (robo-advisor) at random
times. Unlike Bjo¨rk and Murgoci [2013], we consider adaptive control laws rather than the more restrictive
feedback laws, and show that the optimal control law for the dynamic mean-variance problem is in fact of
feedback form.
Our study also contributes to the growing literature on robo-advising. Noticeable contributions include
D’Acunto et al. [2018], who empirically show that the adoption of robo-advising increases portfolio diversi-
fication and reduces well-known behavioral biases, such as the disposition effect. Rossi and Utkus [2019a]
study the largest US robo-advisor, Vanguard Personal Advisor Services. They show that, for previously
self-directed investors that signed up for a hybrid robo-advising service, robo-advising significantly increased
the investors’ proportion of wealth invested in low-cost indexed mutual funds, at the expense of individual
stocks and active mutual funds. As in D’Acunto et al. [2018], the investors that benefit the most from
robo-advisors are those with little investment experience, as well as clients with little mutual fund holdings,
or those invested in high-fee active mutual funds.
Rossi and Utkus [2019b] conduct an extensive survey to study the “needs and wants” of individuals
when they hire financial advisors. Their results lend support to the theoretical model of Gennaioli and
Vishny [2015], indicating that traditionally advised individuals hire financial advisors largely to satisfy
various needs other than portfolio return maximization. Namely, they argue that clients choose a traditional
financial advisor primarily for the “human touch”, i.e., the ability to interact with a human and receive
financial advice from a human, and show that the possibility of establishing a trustworthy relationship
with the same advisor increases the client’s perception of value and her overall satisfaction. On the other
hand, robo-advised clients are more interested in the financial performance of their portfolio. These clients
are not particularly interested in having access to expert opinion, and do not have a high need for trust.
Furthermore, they find that individuals most likely to adopt robo-advising are those interested in acquiring
knowledge and improving their investment allocation, while those who wish to completely delegate their
investment decisions, and therefore have a need for trust, are more reluctant to consider robo-advising.
3 Modeling Framework
The modeling framework consists of four main components: (i) The robo-advisor, which solves dynamic
portfolio optimization problems, incorporating its view of the client’s risk preferences, (ii) the interaction
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mechanism between the robo-advisor and the client, (iii) the market model for the investment securities, and
(iv) the investment criterion.
3.1 Robo-Advisor’s view of Client
The robo-advisor quantifies the client’s risk preferences by a risk aversion parameter. At the start of the
investment process, the client communicates to the robo-advisor her initial risk preferences. Most robo-
advisors solicit this information by presenting an online questionnaire to the client, asking for information
on, e.g., income, education, household status, investment goals, and potential reactions to hypothetical
future market events (see, among others, Lam [2016], Ch. 3). The robo-advisor then translates the client’s
feedback into a numerical score, herein referred to as the client’s risk aversion parameter. We abstract from
the construction of this numerical translation, effectively assuming that the client communicates directly her
risk aversion parameter to the robo-advisor.
The client knows her risk aversion parameter at all times, but only communicates it to the robo-advisor
at specific updating times. At each updating time, the robo-advisor maps the risk aversion parameter
communicated by the client to the nearest value in a finite set of representative risk aversion levels
Γ := {γ¯1, γ¯2, . . . , γ¯K}, K ≥ 1.
The discretization above mimics the fact that, in practice, the robo-advisor translates client information
into a a finite number of risk aversion scores, where each risk score is representative of a category of clients
with a similar risk profile (see, e.g., Lam [2016] and Phoon and Koh [2018]).4 Without loss of generality, we
assume the risk aversion levels in Γ to be sorted in increasing order, i.e., 0 < γ¯1 < γ¯2 < · · · < γ¯K <∞.
Between consecutive updating times, the robo-advisor receives no input from the client, and assumes that
the (unobserved) evolution of the client’s risk aversion follows a centered random walk with independent and
identically distributed increments, whose standard deviation depends on the most recently communicated
risk aversion level. For risk aversion level γ ∈ Γ, we denote this standard deviation by σγ > 0, and refer to
it as the volatility of the random walk; a higher σγ implies that it is more likely for the client to transition
from γ to a different risk aversion level. The random walk model captures the fact that while the client’s risk
aversion may change over time, it is much more likely to move between neighboring levels than swiftly going
from a high risk aversion level to a low risk aversion level, or vice versa. In addition to explaining changes
in the client’s risk aversion, the volatility of the random walk accounts for other sources of uncertainty in
the communication of risk preferences, such that the fact that the questionnaire used by the robo-advisor to
elicit risk preferences cannot provide a complete picture of the client’s risk preferences.
More concretely, at time n ≥ 0 we denote by τn ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n} the last updating time prior to and
including time n, and by γ˘0 > 0 the initial risk aversion communicated by the client. We then introduce the
random walk process (γ˘n)n≥0, defined by
γ˘n := γτn−1 + σγτn−1 (Z˘τn−1+1 + · · ·+ Z˘n), n > 0, (3.1)
where (Z˘n)n≥1 is a sequence of i.i.d. N (0, 1) random variables, defined on a probability space (Ω,F ,P), and
γn := Ψ(γ˘τn) :=
∑
γ∈Γ
γ1{γ˘τn∈(γ−,γ+)}, n ≥ 0, (3.2)
where the function Ψ maps its argument to the nearest risk aversion level in Γ,5 and for each γ ∈ Γ, the
constants γ± are defined by
γ+ :=
{ γ¯k+γ¯k+1
2 , γ = γ¯k, 1 ≤ k < K,∞, γ = γ¯K , , γ
− :=
{ ∞, γ = γ¯1,
γ¯k+γ¯k−1
2 , γ = γ¯K , 1 < k ≤ K.
(3.3)
4One of the major robo-advising firms, Wealthfront, constructs a composite Risk Score ranging from 0.5 (most risk averse)
to 10.0 (most risk tolerant) in increments of 0.5. Each Risk Score corresponds to one of twenty asset allocations, with target
volatilities ranging from 5.5% per year to 15.0% per year. We refer to https://research.wealthfront.com/whitepapers/
investment-methodology/ for additional details.
5The mapping Ψ may project its argument upward or downward. Alternatively, one can define Ψ so that it always projects
its argument to a higher risk aversion level, to err on the safe side and decrease the probability of taking more risk than the
client specifies.
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The process (γ˘n)n≥0 in (3.1) models the client’s risk aversion between consecutive updating times, and it is
not observable by the robo-advisor. Rather, the robo-advisor forms its own view of the client’s risk aversion
through the process (γn)n≥0, defined in (3.2). In other words, the process (γn)n≥0 serves as a proxy of the
client’s actual risk aversion. At any time n ≥ 0, it is given by γn = Ψ(γ˘τn), where γ˘τn is communicated by
the client to the robo-advisor at the most recent updating time, τn. Between two consecutive updating times,
the process (γn)n≥0 is kept constant at the most recent risk aversion level. This is visually illustrated in
Figure 1, that displays a sample path of the client’s risk aversion level. The process (τn)n≥0, that determines
the times at which the process (γn)n≥0 can take on a new value, is determined by an exogenously specified
updating rule, as discussed in the following section.
In summary, the client’s risk aversion is assumed to evolve according to a random walk, that is reset at
each updating time to the nearest risk aversion level in Γ. Specifically, if n > 0 is an updating time, then
γn = Ψ(γ˘n) ∈ Γ is the client’s updated risk aversion level, where γ˘n is the realization of a random walk
starting at the previous updating time τn−1, from the corresponding risk aversion level γτn−1 , with volatility
σγτn−1 . The random walk is then restarted at time n from the updated risk aversion level γn, and with
volatility σγn .
Remark 3.1. We have not included a drift in the random walk dynamics (3.1), because the process (γ˘n)n≥0
captures idiosyncratic shocks to the client’s risk aversion, and should be devoid of a predictable component.
Empirical research has identified a clear trend of risk preferences over the life cycle: At a young age,
individuals are more willing to take risks than adults, but as they grow older, they become increasingly risk
averse, and their risk preferences gradually converge to those of their older counterparts; see, for instance,
Levin et al. [2017]. A deterministic risk aversion component (e.g., related to age) can be modeled separately
by decomposing the risk aversion process observed by the robo-advisor as γn = γ
(1)
n + γ
(2)
n , where (γ
(1)
n )n≥0
is a random process capturing idiosyncratic risk preferences, as described in this section, and (γ
(2)
n )n≥0 is a
deterministic process.
3.2 Interaction between Client and Robo-Advisor
The times of interaction between the client and the robo-advisor are determined by an updating rule, decided
at the beginning of the investment horizon, and used throughout the investment horizon. It is specified by
a deterministic function
φ : Γ 7→ N¯ := {1, 2, . . . } ∪ {∞},
where φ(γ) is the time elapsing till the next update of risk preferences, starting at risk aversion level γ ∈ Γ,
φ(γ) = inf{n > 0 : τn = n |γ0 = γ}.
Examples of such updating rules include the full-information rule, φ ≡ 1, where the risk preferences are
updated at all times, and the no-information rule, φ ≡ ∞, where the risk preferences are never updated.
All other updating rules lie between those two extreme cases.
For a given updating rule φ, the corresponding sequence of interaction times between the client and the
robo-advisor, (T
(φ)
k )k≥0, can be iteratively computed as T
(φ)
0 = 0 and
T
(φ)
k+1 = T
(φ)
k + φ(γT (φ)k
), k ≥ 0. (3.4)
Observe that the k-th updating time, T
(φ)
k , together with the realized risk aversion level, γT (φ)k
, determines
the (k + 1)-th updating time, but further updating times are random and depend on future realized risk
aversion levels. In Lemma A.1-(c) we show that (γ
(φ)
k )k≥0, the sequence of risk aversion levels observed by
the robo-advisor, defined by
γ
(φ)
k := γT (φ)k
, (3.5)
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Figure 1: The figure displays the client/robo-advisor interaction system. It shows a sample path of the client’s
risk aversion level process, (γn)n≥0, which is observable by the robo-advisor. The initial risk aversion level is
communicated by the client at the beginning of the investment process, t = 0. Subsequent communication
times are determined by the updating rule φ that is also specified at t = 0. Between consecutive updating
times, the risk aversion level viewed by the robo-advisor is constant, and the robo-advisor manages the
client’s portfolio without any further input from the client.
is an irreducible and aperiodic Markov chain on Γ, with a time-homogeneous transition matrix. In particular,
for the special case φ ≡ 1, i.e., when the client’s risk preferences are updated at all times, the risk aversion
level process (γn)n≥0 is itself a time-homogeneous Markov chain on Γ (see Lemma A.1-(d)).
Notice that the updating rule φ determines the updating times at which the client’s risk preferences
are communicated. The chosen updating rule therefore determines the uncertainty surrounding the robo-
advisor’s investment decisions, arising from the robo-advisor not having access to up-to-date information
when allocating the client’s wealth. In Section 5.1 we propose a measure of regret to quantify this effect,
and in Section 6.1 we describe how the robo-advisor can calibrate a threshold updating rule to maintain a
given target level of regret across risk aversion levels.
Remark 3.2. The set of updating rules can be extended to include those characterized by a sequence of
deterministic functions, (φn)n≥0, such that, for each γ ∈ Γ,
φn(γ) = inf{n′ > n : τn′ = n′|τn = n, γn = γ},
is the time until the next update of risk preferences, following an update at time n that resulted in risk
aversion level γ. The results in Section 4 still hold for this general case. To keep the analysis herein simple,
we work with time-homogeneous updating rules in the sense that φn is independent of n. That is, for any
n ≥ 0, we assume that
φn(γ) = inf{n′ > n : τn′ = n′|τn = n, γn = γ} = inf{n > 0 : τn = n|γ0 = γ} = φ0(γ).
This naturally includes the updating rules φ ≡ 1 and φ ≡ ∞.
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3.3 Market Dynamics
The market consists of a risk-free money market account (Bn)n≥0 and a risky asset (Sn)n≥0 with dynamics
Bn+1 = (1 + r)Bn,
Sn+1 = (1 + n+1)Sn,
where r ≥ 0 is the constant risk-free rate, and (n)n≥1 is a sequence of i.i.d. random variables, with mean
µ > r and variance σ2 > 0. This sequence is assumed to be independent of the sequence (Z˘n)n≥1, introduced
in (3.1), but defined on the same probability space. We denote by (Xn)n≥0 the wealth process of the client,
allocated between the risky asset and the money market account, with pin denoting the amount invested in
the risky asset. Under a self-financing control law (pin)n≥0, the wealth dynamics are
Xpin+1 = (1 + r)X
pi
n + (n+1 − r)pin =: RXpin + Zn+1pin. (3.6)
The random variable Zn+1 denotes the excess return of the risky asset over the risk-free rate, between times
n and n+ 1, and it has mean µ¯ := µ− r > 0 and variance σ2 > 0.
On the probability space (Ω,F ,P), supporting the independent sequences of random variables, (Z˘n)n≥1,
that drive the risk aversion process in (3.1), and (Zn)n≥1, that drive the risky asset process above, we denote
by (Fn)n≥0 the smallest filtration such that
X(n) := (Xk)0≤k≤n, γ(n) := (γk)0≤k≤n, τ(n) := (τk)0≤k≤n,
are measurable with respect to Fn. The control law (pin)n≥0 in (3.6) is assumed to be adapted to this
filtration. Furthermore, for each updating rule φ, we define the probability measure P(φ) on (Ω,F), under
which the updating times for the client’s risk preferences are given by (3.4), and, for any n ≥ 0, we use the
shorthand notation
P(φ)n (·) := P(φ)(·|Fn).
We let E(φ)n denote the expected value with respect to the probability measure P(φ)n . Note also that the
filtration (Fn)n≥0 models the information that is available to the robo-advisor, and the expected value E(φ)n
thus averages over future paths of both the asset price process (Xn)n≥0, and the risk aversion process (γn)n≥0
observed by the robo-advisor. More specifically, for an Fn′ -measurable random variable Y , where n′ > n, the
expected value E(φ)n [Y ] averages over future paths of the processes (Xk)n≤k≤n′ and (γk)n≤k≤n′ , given the σ-
algebra Fn. Note also that under the probability measure P(φ)n , the distribution of (γk)n≤k≤n′ is determined
by the joint distribution of the future updating times, (T
(φ)
k )k≥0, restricted to the interval {n, n+ 1, . . . , n′},
and the corresponding risk aversion levels communicated by the client, γ
T
(φ)
k
.
3.4 Investment Criterion
The robo-advisor’s objective is to optimally allocate the client’s wealth using a mean-variance criterion,
but also accounting for the stochastic nature of the client’s risk preferences described in Section 3.1. For
this purpose, we develop an adaptive extension of such criteria, namely, a dynamic version of the standard
Markowitz [1952] mean-variance problem, that adapts to the client’s changing risk preferences. We proceed
to introduce this criterion next, which we refer to as an adaptive mean-variance criterion.
Let T ≥ 1 be a fixed investment horizon. For each n ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T − 1} we consider the mean-variance
functional
J
(φ)
n,T (X(n), γ(n), τ(n), θ, pi) := E
(φ)
n [r
pi
n,T ]−
∆n
2
V ar(φ)n [r
pi
n,T ], (3.7)
where rpin,T is the simple return obtained by following the control law pi between time n and the terminal
date T ,
rpin,T :=
XpiT −Xn
Xn
. (3.8)
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In the sequel we will also refer to a control law pi := (pin,T )0≤n<T as a strategy or allocation, and we consider
real-valued, (Fn)n≥0-adapted control laws of the form
pin,T = pin,T (X(n), γ(n), τ(n), θ), 0 ≤ n < T.
The coefficient ∆n > 0 in (3.7) quantifies the risk-return tradeoff at time n, that is determined by the
interaction between the client and the robo-advisor. If ∆n is chosen to be independent of n, then (3.7)
reduces to the classical mean-variance criterion. Herein, we propose a much richer structure for ∆n, in order
to incorporate not only the most recently communicated risk aversion level, but also the uncertainty the
robo-advisor undertakes in assessing the client’s risk aversion. Specifically, ∆n depends on the most recent
risk aversion value communicated by the client, γn, and the corresponding time of communication, τn. It also
depends on a parameter θ ≥ 0 that quantifies the level of caution the robo-advisor exhibits due to it being
uncertain about the client’s true risk aversion. We choose to define this uncertainty in terms of δn(γ, τ), the
conditional standard deviation of the client’s (unknown) risk aversion level at time n ≥ 0, given that the
risk aversion level γ ∈ Γ was communicated at the most recent updating time τ ≤ n,
δn(γ, τ) :=
√
V ar[Ψ(γ˘n)|γn = γ, τn = τ ]. (3.9)
This quantity is computable in closed-form, as shown in Lemma A.1-(d). We then consider an additive
structure for the risk-return tradeoff coefficient, namely,
∆n := ∆n(γn, τn, θ) := γn + θδn(γn, τn). (3.10)
The term γn is the client-specific component of the risk-return tradeoff and incorporates the most recently
communicated risk aversion level of the client. The term θδn(γn, τn) is specific to the robo-advisor, i.e., it is
machine-specific, and arises because the robo-advisor does not have knowledge of the client’s risk preferences
at all times. At updating times, we have that δn(γn, τn) = 0, and the machine-specific component vanishes.
However, between consecutive updating times, δn(γn, τn) > 0 and θ can, in turn, be viewed as the weight
of uncertainty in the robo advisor’s view of the client. A robo-advisor that is very risk averse towards its
incomplete knowledge of the client’s risk preferences chooses a high value of θ (see Section 5.2 for further
discussion). This parallels the notion of market price of risk in classical investment theory, but the main
difference here is that there is uncertainty about the client’s characteristics rather than about the market
dynamics.
At time n, the robo-advisor’s objective is to maximize the risk-adjusted return on the client’s wealth,
defined by the objective function J
(φ)
n,T in (3.7). Through the wealth dynamics (3.6), this function depends
on the control law pi restricted to the time points {n, n + 1, . . . , T − 1}, and the robo-advisor chooses the
control pin,T given future control decisions until the terminal date, pin+1:T := {pin+1,T , pin+2,T , . . . , piT−1,T }.
Any candidate optimal control law pi∗ is therefore such that for each n ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T − 1},
sup
pi∈A∗n
J
(φ)
n,T (X(n), γ(n), τ(n), θ, pi) = J
(φ)
n,T (X(n), γ(n), τ(n), θ, pi
∗), (3.11)
where A∗n := {pi : pin+1:T = pi∗n+1:T } is the set of control laws that coincide with pi∗ after time n. If a control
law pi∗ satisfying (3.11) exists, we define the corresponding value function at time n as
V
(φ)
n,T (X(n), γ(n), τ(n), θ) := J
(φ)
n,T (X(n), γ(n), τ(n), θ, pi
∗). (3.12)
Note that any optimal control naturally depends on the updating rule φ, as such a rule divides the investment
horizon into subperiods via the corresponding (random) updating times. Observe that this implies the
presence of two temporal scales in our framework. The robo-advisor rebalances the portfolio at times
{0, 1, . . . , T−1}, while the risk aversion process (γ(φ)k )k≥0, defined in (3.5), is a Markov chain whose transition
times occur at a coarser time scale determined by the updating rule φ. The updating rule also highlights
the dynamic feature of the family of mean-variance problems we introduce. Specifically, it is a family of
sequentially adaptive problems in the sense that at each updating time, a new problem arises, depending on
the realized risk aversion level, but with the same initially determined terminal date.
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Remark 3.3. At any time n, the risk-return coefficient ∆n is Fn-measurable, but the optimal strategy at
time n depends on the evolution of the client’s risk aversion, throughout the investment horizon. Specifi-
cally, at the initial time, the robo-advisor has a model for the future evolution of the client’s risk aversion,
throughout the investment horizon. This model is given by the process (γn)n≥0 in (3.2), which depends
on the client’s initially communicated risk aversion level, and the updating rule used to determine future
times of interaction with the client. When determining the optimal strategy, the robo-advisor averages over
future risk aversion paths implied by this model. At time one, if there is not an update, the dynamics of the
robo-advisor’s model for the future evolution of the client’s risk aversion remains the same. This continues
until the first updating time, at which the robo-advisor updates its model for the future evolution of the
client’s risk aversion, throughout the remaining investment horizon, based on the newly communicated risk
aversion level. To construct the optimal strategy, the robo-advisor then averages over future risk-aversion
paths implied by the updated model, and this process continues until the terminal date is reached.
Finally, we note that maximizing the return on the client’s wealth, as in the objective function (3.7), is
equivalent to maximizing the client’s risk-adjusted terminal wealth. Namely, we can define
J˜
(φ)
n,T (X(n), γ(n), τ(n), θ, pi) := E
(φ)
n [X
pi
T ]−
1
2
∆n
Xn
V ar(φ)n [X
pi
T ],
and observe that the two objective functions are related by
J˜
(φ)
n,T (X(n), γ(n), τ(n), θ, pi) = Xn(1 + J
(φ)
n,T (X(n), γ(n), τ(n), θ, pi)).
In other words, at any time n ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T − 1}, maximizing J (φ)n,T over pi is equivalent to maximizing
J˜
(φ)
n,T over pi. It then follows that any solution to the optimization problem (3.11) is also a solution of the
corresponding optimization problem defined in terms of J˜
(φ)
n,T . Furthermore, from the expression of J˜
(φ)
n,T it
can be easily seen that the risk-return tradeoff in J
(φ)
n,T is decreasing in the current wealth Xn.
Example 1. To illustrate the features of our framework, we provide an example with a one year investment
horizon consisting of three investment periods, i.e., T = 3. We also consider three representative risk aversion
levels given by Γ = {γ¯1, γ¯2, γ¯3} = {2.5, 3.5, 4.5}.6 The optimal amount of wealth allocated to the risky asset is
then a strategy pi∗ = (pi∗0,T , pi
∗
1,T , pi
∗
2,T ), specifying the allocations made at times n = 0, 1, 2, and the potential
interaction times between the client and the robo-advisor are n = 1, 2.
We set the risk aversion volatility to σγ = 0.30, for each risk aversion level γ ∈ Γ. As mentioned in
Section 3.3, the client’s risk aversion levels at updating times form a Markov chain, and in the special case of
risk preferences being updated at all times, the transition matrix Λ (see (A.8)), corresponding to the volatility
profile specified above, is given by
Λ =
 1− p/2 p/2 0p/2 1− p p/2
0 p/2 1− p/2
 =
 0.9 0.1 00.1 0.8 0.1
0 0.1 0.9
 .
This corresponds to a symmetric random walk with probability p = 0.1 of jumping to a neighboring level.
The robo-advisor initially communicates with the client at time 0 and then considers three different
updating schedules for the client’s risk preferences, corresponding to different rates of client participation in
the investment process:
(i) Updates at times n = 1 and n = 2, which corresponds to the full-information updating rule, φ ≡ 1. In
this case, the robo-advisor always knows the client’s risk aversion.
(ii) No further updates after the initial communication, which corresponds to the no-information updating
rule, φ ≡ ∞. In this case, the optimal investment strategy turns out to be the same as in a model where
the client’s risk aversion is assumed to be constant.
6The optimal allocations corresponding to γ = 3.5 are close to the classical 60/40 portfolio composition. This is the widely
popular passive investing strategy of Jack Bogle, the founder of The Vanguard Group, who is credited with creating the first
index fund.
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(iii) The third case lies between the first two cases, and corresponds to updates at every other time point, so
φ ≡ 2. Hence, the client’s risk preferences are only communicated to the robo-advisor at time n = 2.
The optimal investment strategy associated with criterion (3.7) naturally depends on which of the three
updating schedules for the client’s risk preferences is chosen. In Table 1, we report the optimal proportion of
wealth allocated to the risky asset for the two extreme cases, with the risk preferences either updated at both
times or never updated.7 The results show that the optimal proportion at a given time and at a given risk
aversion level is not very sensitive to when this risk aversion level was observed (the two numbers within each
cell are quite close). However, if the risk aversion level at a given time does not reflect the client’s current risk
preferences, there is “regret” associated with the optimal asset allocation. The updating schedule quantifies
the tradeoff between having a low regret, which requires frequent updating, and having a low involvement in
the investment process, which requires less frequent updating (see Section 5.1 where the concept of “regret”
is introduced and this example is continued).
pi∗n,T (γn, τn, θ) n = 0 n = 1 n = 2
γn = γ¯1 = 2.5
τn = n 0.789 0.838 0.894
τn = 0 0.785 0.836 0.894
γn = γ¯2 = 3.5
τn = n 0.577 0.607 0.638
τn = 0 0.579 0.607 0.638
γn = γ¯3 = 4.5
τn = n 0.456 0.476 0.496
τn = 0 0.458 0.477 0.496
Table 1: For a one year horizon and three investment periods (T = 3), the table reports pi∗n,T (γn, τn, θ), the
optimal proportion of wealth allocated to the risky asset at time n ∈ {0, 1, 2}, with the most recent risk
aversion level being γn ∈ Γ, communicated at time τn ≤ n. The market parameters on an annualized basis
are set to r = 0.04, µ¯ = 0.08, and σ = 0.20. We set θ = 0.
4 Optimal Investment under Client/Robo-Advisor Interaction
In this section, we present the solution to the optimization problem introduced in Section 3.4. It is well
known that even if the risk-return tradeoff ∆n is constant through time, the family of optimization problems
defined by the objective functions in (3.7),
{sup
pi
J
(φ)
n,T (X(n), γ(n), τ(n), θ, pi)}0≤n<T ,
is time-inconsistent, in the sense that if the control law pi∗ maximizes J (φ)n,T (X(n), γ(n), τ(n), θ, pi), then the re-
striction of pi∗ to the time points {n+1, n+2, . . . , T−1}may not maximize J (φ)n+1,T (Xpi
∗
(n+1), γ(n+1), τ(n+1), θ, pi),
where Xpi
∗
(n+1) is equal to (X(n), X
pi∗
n+1), and X
pi∗
n+1 is obtained by applying the control pi
∗
n,T to Xn at time
n. We refer to Bjo¨rk and Murgoci [2013] and references therein for a general treatment of time-inconsistent
stochastic control in discrete time.
As standard in this literature (see, for instance, Bjo¨rk and Murgoci [2013] and Bjo¨rk et al. [2014]), we view
the optimization problem in (3.11) as a multi-player game, with one player at each time n ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T −1}
thought of as a future self of the client. Player n then wishes to maximize the objective function J
(φ)
n,T ,
but decides only the control pin,T , while pin+1:T are chosen by her future selves. The resulting optimal
control strategy, pi∗, is the subgame perfect equilibrium of this dynamic game, and can be computed using
backward induction. At time n = T − 1, the equilibrium control pi∗T−1,T is obtained by maximizing J (φ)T−1,T
7In Section 4, we show that the optimal strategy has the following form: At any time, the amount allocated to the risky
asset is proportional to current wealth, with the proportion being a function of both the most recent risk aversion level and the
most recent updating time (see (4.3)).
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over piT−1,T , which is a standard optimization problem. For n < T − 1, the equilibrium control pi∗n,T is
then obtained by letting player n choose pin,T to maximize J
(φ)
n,T , given that player n
′ will use pi∗n′,T , for
n′ = n+ 1, n+ 2, . . . , T − 1.
The unique structure of our problem, where the client and the robo-advisor interact, implies that the
optimal control pi∗ depends also on φ, the updating rule used to solicit the client’s risk preferences, as
described in Section 3.2.
Next, we first present the solution in the case of a general updating rule φ, and then discuss properties of
the solution by focusing on the two extreme cases of full information, φ ≡ 1, and of no information, φ ≡ ∞.
As we will show, for a general updating rule φ, the solution exhibits properties of the solutions in those
two limiting cases, and in Section 5 we will further analyze how the updating rule φ determines the client’s
regret.
Proposition 4.1. The optimization problem (3.11) is solved by the control law
pi∗n,T (Xn, γn, τn, θ) =
µ¯/σ2
∆n
µan(γn, τn)−R∆n(µbn(γn, τn)− (µan(γn, τn))2)
µbn(γn, τn) +
(
µ¯
σ
)2
(µbn(γn, τn)− (µan(γn, τn))2)
Xn, 0 ≤ n < T. (4.1)
Above, for each γn ∈ Γ, and each 0 ≤ τn ≤ n, we have defined
µan(γn, τn) := E(φ)n [an+1(γn+1, τn+1)], µbn(γn, τn) := E(φ)n [bn+1(γn+1, τn+1)], (4.2)
with an(γn, τn) and bn(γn, τn) satisfying the backward recursions
an(γn, τn) = µ
a
n(γn, τn)(R+ µ¯pi
∗
n(γn, τn)), 0 ≤ n < T,
bn(γn, τn) = µ
b
n(γn, τn)(σ
2(pi∗n(γn, τn))
2 + (R+ µ¯pi∗n(γn, τn))
2), 0 ≤ n < T,
with aT (γT , τT ) = bT (γT , τT ) = 1, for all γT ∈ Γ and 0 ≤ τT < T .
In Appendix D, we provide a pseudocode for the backward recursion used to compute the optimal risky
asset allocation above. We recall that R, µ¯, and σ, are the market parameters, introduced in Section 3.4,
and that ∆n is the risk-return tradeoff coefficient, defined in (3.10). We also stress that the optimal solution
pi∗ depends on the updating rule φ, but for readability purposes we omit this dependence in the notation.
Similarly, the dependence of the an- and bn-coefficients on θ, φ, and the investment horizon T , is not explicitly
highlighted. From the optimal allocation formula (4.1), we see that
pi∗n,T (Xn, γn, τn, θ) = pi
∗
n,T (γn, τn, θ)Xn, 0 ≤ n < T, (4.3)
where, with a slight abuse of notation, we use pi∗n,T (γn, τn, θ) to denote the optimal proportion of wealth
allocated to the risky asset. Hence, the objective function (3.7) exhibits constant relative risk aversion: The
optimal portfolio composition at time n is independent of the client’s current wealth, Xn.
From (4.1), we also see that the optimal solution is Markovian, as the amount of wealth allocated to
the risky asset at time n is a function of the current wealth, Xn, the most recently communicated level of
the client’s risk aversion, γn, and the corresponding updating time, τn. However, recalling the discussion at
the end of Section 3.3, we stress that the optimal allocation at time n depends on the future evolution of
the client’s risk aversion level, (γk)n≤k<T , and, thus, also on the future evolution of the risk-return tradeoff
coefficient, (∆k)n≤k<T . In the recursive formulation, this is seen from the presence of the expected values
in (4.2); these values are computed explicitly and further discussed in Remark 4.2 below.
The coefficients an(γn, τn) and bn(γn, τn) in Proposition 4.1 are the first and second moments of the
future value of one dollar invested optimally between time n and the terminal date T , when the most recent
interaction between the client and the robo-advisor occurred at time τn and the communicated risk aversion
level was γn. That is,
an(γn, τn) = E(φ)n [1 + rpi
∗
n,T ], bn(γn, τn) = E(φ)n [(1 + rpi
∗
n,T )
2],
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with the simple return rpi
∗
n,T defined in (3.8). It follows that the value function (3.12) is given by
V
(φ)
n,T (γn, τn, θ) = an(γn, τn)− 1−
∆n
2
(bn(γn, τn)− a2n(γn, τn)), 0 ≤ n ≤ T, (4.4)
which is independent of the current wealth Xn.
Remark 4.2. The expected values appearing in the objective function Jφn,T in (3.7) are computed by
averaging over future paths of the client’s risk aversion (see the discussion at the end of Section 3.3 and
Remark 3.3). In the optimal allocation formula (4.1) this averaging takes place through the expected values
given in (4.2), which link the optimal allocations at consecutive time points. These expected values admit
explicit representations given by
µan(γn, τn) =
∑
γ∈Γ
pτn+1(γ; γn, τn)an+1(γ, τn+1), µ
b
n(γn, τn) =
∑
γ∈Γ
pτn+1(γ; γn, τn)bn+1(γ, τn+1),
where the transition probabilities pτn+1(γ; γn, τn), for each γ ∈ Γ, are given explicitly in Lemma A.1-(a). Ob-
serve that, consistently with intuition, the optimal risky asset allocation at time n is increasing in µan(γn, τn),
the expected future value of one dollar invested in the optimal strategy between times n + 1 and T , and
decreasing in its variance, µbn(γn, τn)− (µan(γn, τn))2.
There are now two distinct cases. First, if τn+1 = τn < n + 1, the client’s risk-preferences are not
solicited at time n+1, and pτn+1(γn; γn, τn) = 1, so µ
a
n(γn, τn) = an+1(γn, τn) and µ
b
n(γn, τn) = bn+1(γn, τn).
Second, if τn+1 = n + 1, the client’s risk preferences are solicited at time n + 1, and the probabilities
{pn+1(γ; γn, τn)}γ∈Γ link the optimal allocation at time n, corresponding to γn and τn, to the optimal
allocations at time n+ 1, corresponding to γ and n+ 1, for each γ ∈ Γ. In this case, the probability that the
realized risk aversion at time n+ 1 differs from γn is increasing both in the time since the previous update,
(n+ 1)− τn, and in the volatility of the random walk describing the client’s risk aversion, σγn (see Lemma
A.1-(a)). These two cases are pictured in Figure 1. The first case corresponds to the constant components
of the risk aversion trajectory, where the client and the robo-advisor do not interact. The second case
corresponds to the discontinuities observed at the updating times. Prior to each such time, the recursive
formulation involves averaging over the distribution of future risk aversion levels, as described above, with
one risk aversion level eventually being communicated by the client at the updating time. In other words,
prior to each updating time, there is uncertainty in the subsequently communicated risk aversion level, which
translates into uncertainty in the optimal allocation at the updating time.
Next, we present the solution to the optimization problem for the two extreme cases φ ≡ 1 and φ ≡ ∞.
The former implies that ∆n = γn, so there is no θ-dependence, and we denote the optimal proportion of
wealth allocated to the risky asset by pi∗n,T (γn, n). The latter case implies that ∆n = γ0 + θδn(γ0, 0), and we
use the notation pi∗n,T (γ0, θ). In this case, we also use the superscript (∞) in the an- and bn-coefficients to
distinguish them from the case φ ≡ 1.
Proposition 4.3.
(a) Assume that φ ≡ 1. Then, the optimal proportion of wealth allocated to the risky asset at time n, if
the risk-aversion level is γn ∈ Γ, is given by
pi∗n,T (γn, n) =
µ¯/σ2
γn
E(1)n [an+1(γn+1)]−Rγn(E(1)n [bn+1(γn+1)]− (E(1)n [an+1(γn+1)])2)
E(1)n [bn+1(γn+1)] +
(
µ¯
σ
)2
(E(1)n [bn+1(γn+1)]− (E(1)n [an+1(γn+1)])2)
, (4.5)
for 0 ≤ n < T , where
an(γn) = E(1)n [an+1(γn+1)](R+ µ¯pi∗n(γn, n)), 0 ≤ n < T,
bn(γn) = E(1)n [bn+1(γn+1)](σ2(pi∗n(γn, n))2 + (R+ µ¯pi∗n(γn, n))2), 0 ≤ n < T,
(4.6)
with aT (γT ) = bT (γT ) = 1, for all γT ∈ Γ.
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(b) Assume that φ ≡ ∞. Then, the optimal proportion of wealth allocated to the risky asset at time n, if
the initial risk aversion level is γ0 ∈ Γ, is given by
pi∗n,T (γ0, θ) =
µ¯/σ2
∆n
a
(∞)
n+1(γ0)−R∆n(b(∞)n+1(γ0)− (a(∞)n+1(γ0))2)
b
(∞)
n+1(γ0) +
(
µ¯
σ
)2
(b
(∞)
n+1(γ0)− (a(∞)n+1(γ0))2)
, 0 ≤ n < T,
where
a(∞)n (γ0) = a
(∞)
n+1(γ0)(R+ µ¯pi
∗
n(γ0)), 0 ≤ n < T,
b(∞)n (γ0) = b
(∞)
n+1(γ0)(σ
2(pi∗n(γ0))
2 + (R+ µ¯pi∗n(γ0))
2), 0 ≤ n < T,
(4.7)
with a
(∞)
T (γ0) = b
(∞)
T (γ0) = 1, for all γ0 ∈ Γ.
Recall from Section 3.2 that if φ ≡ 1, the risk aversion level process (γn)n≥0 is a Markov chain with
transition probability matrix Λ defined in (A.8). The expected values in (4.6) thus become
E(1)n [an+1(γn+1)] =
∑
γ∈Γ
Λγn,γan+1(γ), E(1)n [bn+1(γn+1)] =
∑
γ∈Γ
Λγn,γbn+1(γ).
In the case φ ≡ ∞, the entire mass of the distribution at time n+ 1 is put on the risk aversion level γn, i.e.,
E(∞)n [a
(∞)
n+1(γn+1)] = a
(∞)
n+1(γn), E
(∞)
n [b
(∞)
n+1(γn+1)] = b
(∞)
n+1(γn),
with γn = γ0 (see (4.7)).
8 This holds for all times n; it then follows that, if φ ≡ ∞, the sequence of optimal
allocations, (pi∗n(γ0, θ))0≤n<T , becomes “open-loop”. In other words, the optimal strategy throughout the
investment horizon is determined at the initial time, as it does not depend on future risk aversion levels
communicated by the client, simply because there is no communication after the initial time. The value
function (4.4) corresponding to φ ≡ 1 and φ ≡ ∞ becomes
V
(1)
n,T (γn) = an(γn)− 1−
γn
2
(bn(γn)− a2n(γn)),
V
(∞)
n,T (γ0, θ) = a
(∞)
n (γ0)− 1−
∆n
2
(b(∞)n (γ0)− (a(∞)n (γ0))2),
(4.8)
respectively, for 0 ≤ n ≤ T .
From the two cases discussed in Remark 4.2, we can now see how the optimal solution for a general
updating rule φ exhibits properties of the optimal solutions in both of the extreme cases analyzed above:
Between consecutive updating times, when there is no feedback received from the client, the optimal solution
is open-loop, as in the case φ ≡ ∞, while at updating times the optimal solution depends on the realized
risk aversion level, as in the case φ ≡ 1 (see Figure 2).
Informally speaking, the updating rule determines the rate of information arrival from the client, with
a general updating rule interpolating between the two extreme cases, φ ≡ 1 and φ ≡ ∞. Namely, since the
client’s risk aversion evolves like a random walk between consecutive updating times (cf. (3.1)), the variance of
the realized risk aversion at an updating time is increasing in the time elapsing since the previous updating
time. With frequent updating, there is little variation in the client’s risk aversion between consecutive
updating times, as information about the client arrives gradually. With less frequent updating, however,
there is a greater uncertainty in the client’s risk aversion level at updating times, as information about the
client arrives in larger bursts. In Section 5.1 we quantify the effect of this uncertainty using a measure of
regret. In particular, we show that for φ ≡ 1 (risk preferences communicated at all times), the regret is zero,
while for any other updating rule the regret is nonzero, and it is maximized for φ ≡ ∞ (risk preferences
communicated only once at time zero).
Next, we provide a financial interpretation of the optimal portfolio allocation (4.1). As above, we start
with the extreme cases φ ≡ ∞ and φ ≡ 1. For simplicity we assume zero interest rates (R = 1), with the
8In fact, the case φ ≡ ∞ is equivalent to the case φ ≡ 1 with constant risk aversion, i.e., σγ = 0 for all γ ∈ Γ. In that case
Λ is the identity matrix, so all the probability mass at time n+ 1 is placed on the time n risk aversion level.
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Figure 2: For investment horizon T , the figure shows how pi∗n,T (γn, τn, θ), the optimal proportion of wealth
allocated to the risky asset, is determined in a piecewise manner. At the initial time, T
(φ)
0 = 0, the optimal
allocation until the first updating time T
(φ)
1 is determined, as {pi∗n,T (γ0, 0, θ), 0 ≤ n < T (φ)1 } is a determin-
istic sequence, given the initial risk aversion level γ0. In general, given the k-th updating time, T
(φ)
k , and
the realized risk aversion level, γ
T
(φ)
k
, the optimal allocations {pi∗n,T (γT (φ)k , T
(φ)
k , θ), T
(φ)
k ≤ n < T (φ)k+1} is a
deterministic sequence.
general case derived in Appendix B. We also set the machine-specific component of the risk-return tradeoff
to zero, θ = 0, and study the effect of a nonzero θ on the optimal investment strategy studied in Section 5.2.
We denote by Z a random variable with the same distribution as (Zn)n≥1 in (3.6), but independent of it.
Hence, Z ′ := Z/σ has mean µ¯/σ and unit variance.
If φ ≡ ∞, the optimal allocation at time n, given initial risk aversion γ0 ∈ Γ, can be written as
pi∗n,T (γ0; 0) = pi
∗
T−1,T (γ0; 0)
1 + V
(∞)
n+1,T (γ0; 0)− γ02 V ar(∞)n+1[1 + rpi
∗
n+1,T ]
V ar
(∞)
n+1[Z
′(1 + rpi∗n+1,T )]
. (4.9)
This shows that the risky asset allocation at time n is equal to the final period allocation, pi∗T−1,T (γ0; 0),
multiplied by the value at time n+ 1 of one dollar invested optimally between time n+ 1 and the terminal
date T . We then subtract a term that quantifies the uncertainty in this value, and scale everything by
a factor that accounts for the current market scenario, using the random variable Z ′. This scaling factor
captures the uncertainty in the investment return between times n and n+ 1. We have
V ar
(∞)
n+1[Z
′(1 + rpi
∗
n+1,T )] ≥ V ar(∞)n+1[1 + rpi
∗
n+1,T ].
This interpretation can be readily extended to the case φ ≡ 1. For γn ∈ Γ, we note that 1−Λγn,γn is the
probability that the risk aversion level at time n+ 1 will be different from γn, and write
pi∗n,T (γn, n) = pi
∗
T−1,T (γn, T − 1)
1 + V
(1)
n+1,T (γn)− γn2 V ar(∞)n+1[1 + rpi
∗
n+1,T |γn+1 = γn]
V ar
(1)
n+1[Z
′(1 + rpi∗n+1,T )|γn+1 = γn]
+O(1− Λγn,γn).
(4.10)
In the above expression, the value function at time n+ 1 is evaluated at the current risk aversion level, γn.
The interpretation in (4.9) extends up to a O(·) term, which captures the probability that the risk aversion
at time n+ 1 will be different from γn. This probability is larger at a risk aversion level where the transition
probability 1 − Λγn,γn is high, i.e., if the uncertainty about the risk aversion level at time n + 1 is high.
In practice, risk preferences are persistent and stable over time (Schildberg-Horisch [2018]), so most of the
probability mass at time n+ 1 concentrates on the time n risk aversion level, γn.
Finally, for the case of a general updating rule φ, the optimal allocation (4.1) may be written as
pi∗n,T (γn, τn; 0) = pi
∗
T−1,T (γn, τn; 0)
1 + V
(φ)
n+1,T (γn, τn; 0)− γn2 V ar(∞)n+1[1 + rpi
∗
n+1,T |γn+1 = γn]
V ar
(φ)
n+1[Z
′(1 + rpi∗n+1,T )|γn+1 = γn]
+O(1− pτn+1(γn; γn, τn)),
(4.11)
where the error term again comes from the fact that there is a nonzero probability that the risk aversion at
time n+ 1 will be different from γn. As in Remark 4.2, two cases now arise. First, between updating times,
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i.e., if τn+1 = τn < n+ 1, the error term vanishes as in (4.9). Second, at updating times, i.e., if τn+1 = n+ 1,
the error term is nonzero as in (4.10). This further highlights how the solution for a general updating rule
φ lies between the solutions in the two extreme cases of φ ≡ ∞ and φ ≡ 1.
5 Performance of the Client/Robo-Advisor Interaction System
In this section, we study the performance of the interaction system formed by the client and the robo-
advisor, by considering the investment implications of information asymmetry. The form of the risk-return
coefficient in the adaptive mean-variance criterion (see (3.10)) highlights the presence of two effects. First,
the robo-advisor may determine the allocation at time n based on stale information, as the risk aversion level
γn is communicated at time τn ≤ n. We quantify this client-specific effect in Section 5.1, using a proposed
measure of regret. We also quantify the extent to which the robo-advisor underestimates the true regret by
using a discrete set of risk aversion levels to categorize the client, as opposed to using a continuum of risk
aversion levels.9 Second, if θ > 0, the robo-advisor is averse with respect to uncertainty in the client’s risk
aversion, and thus chooses a less risky portfolio composition. In Section 5.2 we quantify this machine-specific
effect on the optimal portfolio allocation. In Section 5.3, we use our measure of regret to study the benefits
of robo-advising on the basis of the client’s involvement in the investment process.
5.1 Client-Specific Effect: Portfolio Regret
The robo-advisor solves the optimal investment problem defined by (3.7) and (3.11), but its investment
decisions depend on its uncertainty about the client’s risk aversion. This uncertainty vanishes at the times
when the client’s risk preferences are communicated. At each time within an updating interval, defined by
two consecutive communication times, the regret is a measure of the difference between the robo-advisor’s
optimal asset allocation given the current risk-return tradeoff coefficient, and a benchmark allocation in
which the risk-return tradeoff coefficient is obtained via an immediate update of risk preferences. Before
formally define this measure of regret, we discuss the rational behind its definition.
In the machine learning literature, regret is traditionally defined as “...the expected decrease in reward
gained due to executing the learning algorithm instead of behaving optimally from the very beginning.” (Kael-
bling et al. [1996]). In our framework, the reward is quantified using a mean-variance criterion, and cannot
be directly used to define regret for the reasons outlined next. First, at a given point in time, an update
of the client’s risk preferences changes the mean-variance criterion, so the value functions before and after
the update are not directly comparable, and there is no guarantee that the latter is larger than the former.
Second, the mean-variance criterion changes through time, as the client’s risk preferences evolve, so the value
functions at different time points are not directly comparable.
In our model, we define regret in terms of the control, i.e., the asset allocation, which can naturally be
compared before and after an update of risk preferences, as well as at different points in time. Consider a
fixed investment horizon T , and an updating rule φ. The regret at time n ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T − 1}, given that
the previous communication of risk preferences took place at time τ ≤ n and resulted in risk aversion level
γ ∈ Γ, is defined as
R˜(φ)n,T (γ, τ) := E(φ)n
[ |pi∗n,T (γn, τn; 0)− pi∗n,T (Ψ(γ˘n), n; 0)|
pi∗n,T (Ψ(γ˘n), n; 0)
∣∣∣γn = γ, τn = τ]. (5.1)
This is the expected relative difference between the robo-advisor’s strategy pi∗n,T (γn, τn; 0), i.e., the optimal
allocation without updating of risk preferences at time n (and thus τn = τ and γn = γ), and pi
∗
n,T (Ψ(γ˘n), n; 0),
i.e., the optimal allocation with updating of risk preferences at time n (and thus τn = n and γn = Ψ(γ˘n)).
In particular, if n is an updating time, so τ = n, then R˜(φ)n,T (γ, τ) = 0. Also observe that we set θ = 0 to
isolate the client-specific component of risk aversion uncertainty, as discussed at the beginning of Section 5.
9While it is theoretically possible to use a continuum of risk aversion levels, it would not be possible to calibrate the model
for such a high level of granularity.
16
We then define a worst-case measure of regret as
R˜(φ)T (γ) := sup
0≤τ≤T−1
sup
τ≤n<nτ
R˜(φ)n,T (γ, τ), (5.2)
where nτ := (τ+φ(γ))∧T . For a fixed value of τ , the quantity supτ≤n<nτ R˜(φ)n,T (γ, τ) is the worst-case regret
when starting at risk aversion level γ at time τ , and following the optimal investment strategy, under the
updating rule φ, until the risk preferences are updated again, or the investment horizon is reached, whichever
comes first. Hence, (5.2) provides a worst-case measure of regret both with respect to the starting point of
the updating interval, τ , and with respect to the time point within the updating interval at which the regret
is evaluated, n.
In Appendix C, we show that
R˜(φ)T (γ) ≤ sup
τ≤n<T
R˜(φ)n,T (γ, τ)
∣∣∣
τ=(T−φ(γ))∨0
+O(1− pφ(γ)(γ; γ)), (5.3)
where we have used that nτ = T for τ = (T − φ(γ)) ∨ 0. That is, the worst-case regret occurs for an
updating interval whose right endpoint coincides with the investment horizon T . The error term in (5.3)
comes from the fact that the regret is local, i.e., it corresponds to a single updating interval bounded by
two consecutive updating times, but the optimal allocations within this interval depend on the risk aversion
levels communicated by the client throughout the remaining investment horizon. We also show that
sup
τ≤n<T
R˜(φ)n,T (γ, τ)
∣∣∣
τ=(T−φ(γ))∨0
= R˜(φ)T−1,T (γ, τ)
∣∣∣
τ=(T−φ(γ))∨0
:= R(φ)T (γ), (5.4)
which states that within the worst-case updating interval, the maximum regret occurs at the very last time
point; because of the random walk assumption (3.1) this is also the point within the updating interval where
the variance of the client’s risk aversion is the largest. Both of these properties are illustrated in Figure 3.
Together, (5.3) and (5.4) state that at any time point within any updating interval starting at risk aversion
level γ, the quantity R(φ)T (γ) is an upper bound for the expected relative change in asset allocation that
would be observed if there were an update of the client’s risk preferences. Also, observe that R(φ)T (γ) only
depends on the updating rule φ via φ(γ), i.e., the time spent at level γ before an update of risk preferences.
That is, R(φ)T (γ) = R(φ
′)
T (γ) for any updating rule φ
′ such that φ′(γ) = φ(γ).
The upper bound R(φ)T (γ) in (5.4) is a measure of the allocation error suffered by the client with risk
aversion level γ ∈ Γ. Next, we define a corresponding steady-state measure of regret,
R¯(φ)T := E[R(φ)T (γ)|γ ∼ λ] =
∑
γ∈Γ
λ(γ)R(φ)T (γ), (5.5)
which is the regret when starting at a risk aversion level drawn from the stationary distribution of the risk
aversion level process (γn)n≥0, denoted by λ. In Lemma A.1-(d) we show that λ is uniquely determined.
Remark 5.1. The steady-state regret (5.5) can be interpreted as the average regret through time, for a
single client with a long investment horizon (e.g., a young client planning for retirement). Alternatively, at a
fixed point in time, the pool of clients of the robo-advisor can be used to construct the stationary distribution
λ, as λ(γ) represents the proportion of clients having risk aversion level γ. The steady-state regret (5.5) can
be then interpreted as the cross-sectional average regret of the robo-advisor’s pool of clients.
The following Proposition provides formulas for the regret measure defined in (5.2) and the upper bound
defined in (5.4). For each γ ∈ Γ and n ≥ 0, we introduce
µn(γ) := E[|Ψ(γ˘n)− γ0||γ0 = γ, τn = 0], (5.6)
which is equal to the expected absolute change in the client’s risk aversion level, in n time steps, starting at
level γ at time zero, and without any intermediate updates of risk preferences. We also define
µcn(γ) := E[|γ˘n − γ0||γ0 = γ, τn = 0], n ≥ 0. (5.7)
17
Figure 3: For investment horizon T = 24 (months), the figure shows the sequence of regret values
{R˜(φ)n,T (γn, τn)}0≤n<T , defined in (5.1), for γn ∈ {2.5, 3.5, 4.5}, and τn = bn/3c × 3, which corresponds
to the updating rule φ ≡ 3 (months). The solid points show the worst-case upper bound R(φ)T (γ), defined in
(5.4), which is equal to R˜(φ)n,T (γn, τn) evaluated at time n = T −1, with γn = γ. The set of risk aversion levels
is Γ = {2, 2.5, 3, 3.5, 4, 4.5, 5}, and the risk aversion volatility is set to σγ = 0.152, for all γ ∈ Γ, which corre-
sponds to a 10% probability of leaving the current risk aversion level in a single step (since
√
4×0.152 ≈ 0.30,
this is comparable to the volatility in Example 1 in Section 3.4, where the step size was four months). The
market parameters on an annualized basis are set to r = 0.04, µ¯ = 0.08, and σ = 0.20.
which coincides with the definition of µn(γ), but without applying the function Ψ to γ˘n, which projects the
random walk γ˘n to the nearest risk aversion level in Γ. Explicit expression for µn(γ) and µ
c
n(γ) are given in
Lemma A.1-(b).
Proposition 5.2. Let T ≥ 1 and φ : Γ 7→ N¯ be an updating rule. Then, the following assertions hold:
(a) For each γ ∈ Γ, the regret measure (5.2) satisfies
R˜(φ)T (γ) ≤ R(φ)T (γ) +O(1− pφ(γ)(γ; γ)),
where the upper bound is defined in (5.4), and given by (see (5.6))
R(φ)T (γ) =
µ(φ(γ)∧T )−1(γ)
γ
. (5.8)
(b) For each γ ∈ Γ, the value R(φ)T (γ) in (5.8) is increasing in φ(γ) and σγ , and
lim
φ(γ)∧T→∞
R(φ)T (γ) =
γ¯K − γ¯1
2γ
, lim
σγ→∞
R(φ)T (γ) =
γ¯K − γ¯1
2γ
.
Furthermore, it satisfies
R(φ)T (γ) ≤ R(φ)T,c(γ), (5.9)
where R(φ)T,c(γ) is given by (see (5.7))
R(φ)T,c(γ) =
µc(φ(γ)∧T )−1(γ)
γ
=
√
2
pi
σγ
γ
√
φ(γ)− 1. (5.10)
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Figure 4: For investment horizon T = 24 (months), the figure shows the regret measures R(φ)T (γ) and
R(φ)T,c(γ), given in Proposition 5.2, for risk aversion level γ ∈ {2.5, 3.5, 4.5}, and time between updates, φ(γ),
ranging from 1 to T . The set of risk aversion levels, risk aversion volatilities, and market parameters, are
the same as in Figure 3.
In the sequel, we refer to the upper bound R(φ)T in (5.8) as the regret of the client . The Proposition shows
that, for γ ∈ Γ, this quantity is increasing in φ(γ), the time spent at risk aversion level γ before an update of
risk preferences, and equal to zero if and only if φ(γ) = 1. The regret is also increasing in the risk aversion
volatility, σγ . In other words, the longer the time before the client’s risk preferences are communicated, the
higher the client’s regret, and this effect is more pronounced at risk aversion levels with a high volatility.
From (5.8) we see that regret is closely related to expected changes in the client’s risk aversion level,
which implies that discrepancy in regret between different risk aversion levels depends on the heterogeneity
between those levels. The formula for R(φ)T,c in (5.10) highlights that this heterogeneity can be proxied
by the heterogeneity of the proportions {σγ/γ}γ∈Γ, which we refer to as relative risk aversion volatilities.
Specifically, given a fixed time between updates of risk preferences, i.e., φ ≡ c, for some c ≥ 1, the regret is
higher at risk aversion levels with a high relative volatility. This can also be seen in Figure 3, which shows
the client’s regret for three different values of relative risk aversion volatility.
The regret measure R(φ)T depends on the risk aversion levels in the discrete set Γ. In particular, for a fixed
γ ∈ Γ, R(φ)T (γ) increases with the granularity of Γ. To quantify the effect of this discretization on regret, we
observe that the difference between µn(γ) and µ
c
n(γ), respectively given in (5.6) and (5.7), is that the latter
is based on a continuous range of risk aversion levels, as γ˘n ∈ R, while the former is based on the discrete
set of risk aversion levels employed by the robo-advisor, as Ψ(γ˘n) ∈ Γ. In turn, the same statement can be
made about the corresponding regret measures, R(φ)T (γ) and R(φ)T,c(γ), which are visualized in Figure 4, with
the latter being larger, as predicted by the inequality in (5.9). Intuitively, the inequality expresses the fact
that even small changes in the underlying random walk model contribute to R(φ)T,c, while such changes are
truncated to zero in the discretization used to compute R(φ)T .
The regret measure R(φ)T,c has the desirable property that it is not affected by the granularity of the set
Γ. For γ ∈ Γ, we can then define
R(φ)T,d(γ) := R(φ)T,c(γ)−R(φ)T (γ) ≥ 0,
which is the additional regret incurred from using a finite number of risk aversion levels, as opposed to
tailoring the risk aversion level to the personal profile of each client. This is a measure of how much the
robo-advisor underestimates the regret by using the discrete set Γ. In particular, R(φ)T,d(γ) is strictly positive
unless φ(γ) = 1, i.e., if the client’s risk aversion is updated after each time step, in which case both regret
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measures are zero. Furthermore, R(φ)T,d(γ) decreases with the granularity of risk aversion levels in Γ, because
a higher granularity increases the robo-advisor’s regret measure R(φ)T (γ) which, in the limit, converges to
R(φ)T,c(γ).
Example 1 (Continued). We continue Example 1 from Section 3.4 to discuss the regret associated with the
robo-advisor’s optimal investment strategy, and its dependence on the uncertainty in the client’s risk aversion
determined by the updating rule for the client’s risk preferences.
Consider first the case that no update of the client’s risk preferences takes place, in which case the entire
strategy profile is determined at time zero by the client’s initial risk aversion level. That is, if τn = 0, and
thus γn = γ0, for n = 1, 2, then the sequence (pi
∗
0,T (γ0, 0, θ), pi
∗
1,T (γ0, 0, θ), pi
∗
2,T (γ0, 0, θ)), given in Table 1, is
the optimal proportion of wealth allocated to the risky asset. Observe that this is also the optimal strategy
of a more “primitive” robo-advisor, namely, one that does not employ a stochastic model for the client’s
risk aversion, but rather assumes it to be constant throughout the investment horizon and equal to that
communicated at the beginning of the investment horizon.
However, with the client’s risk aversion being stochastic, regret accumulates with time by following the
above strategy, with the regret at time n being defined in terms of the relative difference between pi∗n,T (γ0, 0, θ),
and a benchmark allocation that corresponds to an update of risk preferences at time n. For instance, if
γ0 = γ¯2, then at times n = 1, 2 the probability of being at one of the other two levels is approximately np/2,
based on a first order approximation of the transition probabilities corresponding to Λ. Hence, the worst-case
measure of regret in (5.2), corresponding to the no-information rule φ ≡ ∞, satisfies
R˜(φ)T (γ¯2) ≈
[ |pi∗2,T (γ¯2, 0, θ)− pi∗2,T (γ¯1, 0, θ)|
pi∗2,T (γ¯1, 0, θ)
+
|pi∗2,T (γ¯2, 0, θ)− pi∗2,T (γ¯3, 0, θ)|
pi∗2,T (γ¯3, 0, θ)
]
p = 0.114.
For the other extreme case corresponding to the full-information rule φ ≡ 1, when the risk preferences are
updated at all times, the sequence of optimal allocations is given by (pi∗0,T (γ0, 0, θ), pi
∗
1,T (γ1, 1, θ), pi
∗
2,T (γ2, 2, θ),
where γn is the realized risk aversion level at time n ∈ {0, 1, 2}. In this case, the regret is zero, as the robo-
advisor faces no risk of misclassifying the client.
Finally, for the intermediate case where the client’s risk preferences are updated only at time n = 2, i.e.,
φ ≡ 2, we deduce that the worst-case regret measure satisfies
R˜(φ)T (γ¯2) ≈
[ |pi∗1,T (γ¯2, 0, θ)− pi∗1,T (γ¯1, 0, θ)|
pi∗1,T (γ¯1, 0, θ)
+
|pi∗1,T (γ¯2, 0, θ)− pi∗1,T (γ¯3, 0, θ)|
pi∗1,T (γ¯3, 0, θ)
]p
2
= 0.055,
which is about half of the regret in the case of zero updates.
5.2 Machine-Specific Effect: Portfolio Tilting
We study how the robo-advisor’s aversion towards uncertainty in the client’s risk preferences impacts the
optimal portfolio allocation. Recall from (3.10) that at time n, the risk-return tradeoff coefficient is given by
∆n = γn + θδn(γn, τn) =
{
γn, τn = n,
γn + θδn(γn, τn), τn < n,
where δn(γn, τn) is the conditional standard deviation of the client’s (unknown) risk aversion level, with the
most recent risk aversion level, γn ∈ Γ, having been communicated at time τn ≤ n. Then, between updating
times, we have δn(γn, τn) > 0, and the machine-specific component of the risk-return tradeoff, θδn(γn, τn), is
nonzero. The optimal portfolio is therefore tilted towards a less risky composition, relative to the portfolio
corresponding to ∆n = γn. To quantify the magnitude of this change, we define the function
S˜(φ)n,T (γ, τ, θ) :=
|pi∗n,T (γn, τn, θ)− pi∗n,T (γn, τn; 0)|
pi∗n,T (γn, τn; 0)
∣∣∣
γn=γ,τn=τ
,
which is the relative change in the optimal allocation at time n, resulting from using a nonzero value of θ,
given that the previous risk aversion level γ ∈ Γ was communicated at time τ ≤ n.
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We then have the following upper bound (see Appendix C for the proof) for S˜(φ)n,T (γ, τ, θ), which shows
explicitly how the shift in allocation vanishes if θ = 0, and tends to one as θ → ∞. In other words, the
optimal portfolio tends to a risk-free portfolio, as θ →∞.
Proposition 5.3. Let T ≥ 1, θ ≥ 0, and φ : Γ 7→ N¯ be an updating rule. Then, for each γ ∈ Γ, and
0 ≤ τ ≤ n,
S˜(φ)n,T (γ, τ, θ) ≤ Sn(γ, τ, θ) +O(θ(1− pφ(γ)(γ; γ))), 0 ≤ n < T,
where the upper bound is given by
Sn(γ, τ, θ) = θδn(γ, τ)
γ + θδn(γ, τ)
∈ [0, 1), (5.11)
and satisfies
lim
θ→0
Sn(γ, τ, θ) = 0, lim
θ→∞
Sn(γ, τ, θ) = 1.
Observe that if θ = 0, then S˜(φ)n,T (γ, τ, θ) = 0, and that the upper bound S(φ)n (γ, τ, θ) is independent of
the investment horizon T . Furthermore, since δn(γ, τ) = δn−τ (γ, 0) (see Lemma A.1-(d)), the upper bound
only depends on the time since the previous time of communication, n− τ . This can be seen more explicitly
by using the approximation Ψ(γ) ≈ γ10 to write (see Appendix C)
θδn(γ, τ) ≈ θσγ
√
n− τ . (5.12)
Together with (5.11), this highlights that for a given risk aversion level γ ∈ Γ, the magnitude of the allocation
effect is increasing in θ, the risk aversion volatility, σγ , and the time since the previous update, n− τ .
We visualize this effect in Figure 5, for θ ∈ {0, 0.25, 1}11. The left panel corresponds to no updating of
the client’s risk preferences, and the blue curve shows the optimal proportion of wealth allocated to the risky
asset with θ = 0, which is independent of the risk aversion volatility. The red and green curves demonstrate
that a larger value of θ results in a larger downward shift in allocation and that, for a fixed value of θ, a
higher risk aversion volatility has the same effect. The black curves show the downward shift in allocation
predicted by the upper bound in (5.11) and, furthermore, that the shift is indeed larger compared to the
corresponding green and red curves. The right panel corresponds to quarterly updates of the client’s risk
preferences, and shows the effect that a nonzero value of θ has on the optimal allocation throughout the
investment horizon, focusing on a single risk aversion volatility. Finally, note that at times of communication,
when the robo-advisor observes client’s risk aversion level, the allocations corresponding to a nonzero value
of θ are slightly larger than the one corresponding to θ = 0, in anticipation of the fact that, at future time
points, the allocation will be tilted towards a less risky portfolio if θ > 0.
5.3 Client’s Suitability for Robo-Advising
In our model, the client faces a tradeoff between a satisfactory investment performance (i.e., low regret)
and the need for trust and peace of mind (i.e., high level of delegation). A client that aims for low regret
will communicate frequently with the robo-advisor. On the other hand, a client that desires a higher level
of delegation will have a higher regret, because of the increased information asymmetry between the client
and the robo-advisor, resulting from the client’s reduced participation in the investment process. Such a
client may be better off with a traditional financial advisor, with whom she may establish a more “personal”
relationship. These model predictions are consistent with the empirical evidence presented in Rossi and
Utkus [2019b], and surveyed in Section 2 herein.
10The function Ψ, defined in (3.2), projects its argument to the nearest risk aversion level in the set Γ, so this approximation
improves with a higher level of granularity in Γ.
11In Section 6.4 we show how θ = 0.25 and θ = 1 correspond to setting the risk-return tradeoff ∆n to the right endpoint of a
confidence interval for the client’s risk aversion, with significance levels 60% and 85%, respectively. The value θ = 0 corresponds
to taking the center of any confidence interval, as the client’s risk aversion evolves like a centered random walk.
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Figure 5: For investment horizon T = 12 (months), the figure shows the optimal proportion of wealth
allocated to the risky asset, {pi∗n,T (γn, τn, θ)}0≤n<T , at risk aversion level γn = 3.5, for θ ∈ {0, 0.25, 1}. The
left panel sets τn = 0, which corresponds to no updating of risk preferences, and considers three different
levels of risk aversion volatility, σγ = c × 0.152, where c ∈ {1/
√
2, 1,
√
2}, for all γ ∈ Γ. The black curves
corresponds to σγ = 0.152 and show how the allocation corresponding to θ = 0 (blue) shifts downwards
based on the upper bound in (5.11). The right panel sets τn = bn/3c3, which corresponds to quarterly
updates of risk preferences, with risk aversion volatility σγ = 0.152. The set of risk aversion levels, and the
market parameters, are the same as in Figure 3.
Furthermore, for a fixed level of delegation, the client’s regret is increasing in the volatility of her risk
aversion process. In other words, other things being equal, a client with unstable and frequently changing
risk preferences is worse off with the robo-advisor. The risk profile of such a client is likely to be “unusual”,
and the onboarding process used by existing robo-advising systems is unable to provide a complete picture
for clients with complex or specific financial needs. Clients of this type are likely to require tailored services
which go beyond those currently offered by robo-advisors, which are instead better suited to serve clients
with a “typical” risk profile (see, e.g., Phoon and Koh [2018]).
6 Towards the Design of a Personalized Robo-Advisor
In this section we discuss how various components of the robo-advising framework can be calibrated. Section
6.1 shows how the updating rule for the client’s risk preferences can be tailored to the client’s risk aversion
level, in order to maintain a given target level of regret, and Section 6.2 discusses the implications for the
client of the robo-advisor using a less personalized updating rule. Section 6.3 shows how the robo-advisor’s
set of risk aversion levels can be constructed to fix the value of communication for each risk aversion level.
Section 6.4 shows how the machine-specific component of the risk-return tradeoff coefficient can be calibrated
to limit the probability of choosing a too risky portfolio composition for the client.
6.1 Personalizing the Updating Rule
In Section 5.1 we have seen that for a given frequency of interaction between the client and the robo-advisor,
the regret depends on the client’s current risk aversion level, and the corresponding risk aversion volatility.
In this section we show how the robo-advisor can actually calibrate the updating rule for the client’s risk
preferences to maintain a given target level of regret across the various risk aversion levels.
Denote by κ ∈ R¯+ the target regret, and assume for notational simplicity that the investment horizon T
is such that R(φ)T (γ)|φ≡T > κ, for each γ ∈ Γ, with the regret R(φ)T given in (5.8). In other words, without
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any updating of the client’s risk preferences, the regret at each risk aversion level exceeds κ before the end
of the investment horizon. Then, we define the updating rule φκ by
φκ(γ) := sup{n ≥ 1 : R(φ)T (γ)
∣∣∣
φ≡n
< κ}, γ ∈ Γ,
which corresponds to triggering an update of risk preferences right before the regret crosses the level κ. From
Proposition 5.2 it follows that
φκ(γ) = inf{n ≥ 1 : µn(γ) > bκ(γ)}, γ ∈ Γ, (6.1)
with µn(γ) defined in (5.6), and the family of updating thresholds, {bκ(γ)}γ∈Γ, given by
bκ(γ) := γκ. (6.2)
This shows that the updating rule φκ is equal to a threshold updating rule that triggers an update of risk
preferences as soon as the expected absolute change in the client’s risk aversion, since the previous time of
communication, exceeds a certain threshold.12
Notice that for a given risk aversion level, γ ∈ Γ, the threshold bκ(γ) does not depend on the risk aversion
volatility, σγ . It then follows from Lemma A.1-(b) that for a given target regret, the time between updates at
a given risk aversion level needs to decrease to accommodate a higher risk aversion volatility. However, the
threshold is increasing in the risk aversion level itself, γ, indicating that more frequent updating is required
for lower levels of risk aversion, for a fixed level of volatility.13 Intuitively, this is because regret is defined in
terms of relative risk aversion changes, and a given absolute risk aversion change results in a larger relative
change if the initial risk aversion level is low.
At the beginning of the investment process, the client may specify a desired updating frequency, i.e.,
φ ≡ c, for some c ≥ 1, depending on her willingness to participate in the investment process. Given
the client’s initial risk aversion level, γ0 ∈ Γ, the robo-advisor can then compute the corresponding regret,
κ = R(φ)T (γ0), and use (6.2) to compute a family of updating thresholds, {bκ(γ)}γ∈Γ, that allows this client to
maintain the same level of regret across risk aversion levels. When a new risk aversion level is communicated
by the client, a higher updating frequency may be required to maintain the same investment performance.
Alternatively, if the client is unsure or indifferent about her desired updating frequency, the robo-advisor
can use the results in this section to calibrate a default updating rule, that is internally consistent, in terms
of regret, for all risk aversion levels.
6.2 Benefits of Personalization
In the previous section, we have discussed how the robo-advisor can adjust the updating rule to maintain a
given level of regret. In this section, we analyze the client’s regret when working with a robo-advisor which
provides a less personalized service. Specifically, we analyze the effect on regret of an updating rule that
does not depend on the client’s current risk aversion level.
We consider a robo-advisor that chooses the time between updates of risk preferences to be the same,
regardless of the risk aversion level of the client. This frequency might be set arbitrarily by the robo-advisor,
without any notion of regret, or it might be calibrated so that the steady-state regret measure R¯(φ)T , defined
in (5.5), is equal to a specific value, without any regard to the heterogeneity of risk aversion levels. In
Appendix C, we use the approximation Ψ(γ) ≈ γ, as in (5.12), to show that for a given target level of regret
12In fact, from Lemma A.1-(b) it follows that for any updating rule φ, there exists a threshold family {b(φ)(γ)}γ∈Γ such that
φ(γ) = inf{n ≥ 1 : µn(γ) > b(φ)(γ)}, γ ∈ Γ.
That is, any updating rule can be framed as a threshold updating rule, based on expected changes in the robo-advisor’s
stochastic model for the client’s risk aversion.
13This property can also be deduced from Figure 3, which shows the regret profile corresponding to different risk aversion
states, that all have the same risk aversion volatility.
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κ ∈ R¯+,14 we have R¯(φ¯κ)T ≈ κ for an updating rule φ¯κ that satisfies
φ¯κ(γ) ≈ pi
2
κ2
/( ∑
γ′∈Γ
λ(γ′)
σγ′
γ′
)2
, γ ∈ Γ. (6.3)
Notice that φ¯κ(γ) is independent of the risk aversion level γ, so the same time between updates is used at
all risk aversion levels. This updating rule can be compared to the fixed regret updating rule φκ, defined in
(6.1), for which we have, similarly to (6.3), that
φκ(γ) ≈ pi
2
κ2
/(σγ
γ
)2
, γ ∈ Γ. (6.4)
To compare the two updating rules above, we recall from Section 5.1 that for γ ∈ Γ, the proportion σγ/γ
was referred to as the relative risk aversion volatility. From (6.3) we see that in determining the updating
rule φ¯κ, the relative risk aversion volatility is weighted by the stationary distribution λ. In turn, from (6.4)
we deduce that as the heterogeneity in risk aversion levels increases, with heterogeneity measured in terms
of relative risk aversion volatility, the aggregate updating rule becomes less tailored to individual levels. The
effect of heterogeneity can further be witnessed by examining the regret under the aggregate rule φ¯κ, which
satisfies
R(φ¯κ)T (γ) ≈ κ
σγ/γ∑
γ′∈Γ
λ(γ′)(σγ′/γ′)
, γ ∈ Γ. (6.5)
This shows that for a given risk aversion level γ ∈ Γ, the regret is larger (smaller) than κ if the relative risk
aversion volatility, σγ/γ, is higher (lower) than the weighted average of those volatilities, with the weights
determined by the steady-state distribution λ. We can also see, for instance, that the regret at a risk aversion
level with a low weight, perhaps due to a high volatility, can be substantially greater than the target regret
κ. Hence, by using the “one-size-fits-all” updating rule φ¯κ, the robo-advisor is implicitly providing worse
service to clients with certain characteristics. That is, lower regret at certain risk aversion levels comes at
the expense of the regret being higher at other levels.
The analysis above corresponds to a robo-advisor that uses the same updating frequency for all risk
aversion levels. Alternatively, one can consider a robo-advisor that employs a threshold updating rule with
a uniform threshold, i.e., a threshold that does not depend on the risk aversion level. Again, this threshold
might be set arbitrarily by the robo-advisor, or it might be calibrated so that the steady-state regret measure
in (5.5) is equal to a specific value. In this case, one can similarly show that as the heterogeneity of risk
aversion levels increases, the aggregate threshold becomes less tailored to individual levels. This implies,
once more, that the robo-advisor is treating clients at different risk aversion levels differently, in the sense
that a lower regret at certain levels comes at the expense of a higher regret at other levels.
6.3 Value of Interaction
In this section, we study the probability that an interaction leads to a change in the robo-advisor’s view of
the client’s risk aversion. We analyze how the benefits of an interaction depend on the current risk aversion
level of the client.
The threshold family {bκ(γ)}γ∈Γ, defined in (6.2), naturally quantifies the tradeoff between having low
regret, κ, and a low frequency of interactions (i.e., a high threshold). Additionally, it quantifies the tradeoff
between low regret, and a low probability of initiating an update when the client’s risk aversion level has
not changed (false positive). For a general updating rule φ, and investment horizon T , the false positive
probability is defined as
α
(φ)
T (γ) := sup
0≤n<T
P(φ)n (Ψ(γ˘n+φ(γ)) = γ|γn = γ, τn = n)1{n+φ(γ)<T}, γ ∈ Γ.
14As in the previous section, we assume that the investment horizon T is such that R¯(φ)T |φ≡T > κ.
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Given that the risk aversion level γ was communicated at time n, this is the probability that the realized
risk aversion level at the subsequent updating time (as long as it comes before the terminal date T ) is also
equal to γ, maximized over all possible values of the communication time n. In Appendix C, we first provide
a closed form formula for this probability, and then use the same approximation as in (5.12) to show that,
for the fixed regret updating rule φκ,
α
(φκ)
T (γ) ≈ Φ
(√ 2
pi
1
κ
γ+ − γ
γ
)
− Φ
(√ 2
pi
1
κ
γ− − γ
γ
)
, γ ∈ Γ, (6.6)
where the constants γ± are defined in (3.3) as the midpoints between neighboring risk aversion levels. This
highlights the aforementioned tradeoff between having a low regret, κ, that requires frequent updating, and
having a low probability of a false positive, α
(φκ)
T (γ), that requires less frequent updating. Additionally,
we observe that the above expression is independent of the risk aversion volatility, just like the threshold
bκ(γ) is. However, it is evident that a uniformly spaced grid of risk aversion levels, i.e. such that γ
± − γ is
independent of γ, results in a higher false positive probability for low risk aversion levels.
Informally, this means that the value of an update is not the same for all risk aversion levels. Specifically,
for smaller values of γ, a higher proportion of updates does not lead to a change in the client’s risk preference
classification. To guarantee the same false positive rate across all risk aversion levels, the set Γ needs to be
constructed so that the relative distances (γ+−γ)/γ and (γ−γ−)/γ are independent of γ. That is, a higher
granularity is needed for low risk aversion levels compared to high risk aversion levels. The updating rule
φκ guarantees, for such a set Γ, that both the regret and the false positive probabilities are the same across
risk aversion levels.
6.4 Calibration of θ
We show how the robo-advisor can use the machine-specific component of the risk-return tradeoff coefficient
∆n, given in (3.10), to bound the probability of choosing a portfolio for the client that is too risky.
By using the approximation Ψ(γ˘n) ≈ γ˘n, as in (5.12), and γ˘n ∼ N (γn, δn(γn, τn)), which follows from
(3.2), we have that γn ± θδn(γn, τn) is an approximate 100(1 − α)% confidence interval for Ψ(γ˘n), the
client’s (unknown) risk aversion level at time n, where the significance level is α = 2(1 − Φ(θ)). The
risk-return coefficient ∆n is the right endpoint of this confidence interval, i.e., the most risk averse value
within the interval. Hence, the probability of the client actually having a higher risk aversion than ∆n is
approximately α/2 = 1−Φ(θ). Equivalently, this is approximately the probability that the optimal portfolio
composition under information asymmetry (i.e., with risk-return tradeoff ∆n), is riskier than the optimal
portfolio composition under full information (i.e., with ∆n replaced by Ψ(γ˘n)).
If θ = 0, then α/2 = 0.5, and α/2 decreases to zero as θ → ∞. A robo-advisor wishing to set the
probability of choosing a risky portfolio equal to α∗ ∈ [0, 0.5] can choose θ = Φ−1(1 − α∗). Hence, for a
robo-advisor that is more averse against uncertainty in the client’s risk profile (lower α∗), θ will be higher.
7 Conclusions and Future Extensions
The past decade has witnessed the emergence of robo-advisors, investment platforms where clients interact
directly with an investment algorithm, without the intervention of a human. Recent work has provided
empirical evidence on the implications of robo-advising on investment portfolios, and the nature of clients
benefit the most from robo-advisors. In the present work, we build a novel modeling framework that is
consistent with those findings.
We present a dynamic investment model between a client and a robo-advisor, where the investment
performance criterion automatically adapts to changes in the client’s risk profile. These changes are self-
reported by the client, via repeated interaction with the robo-advisor, throughout the investment horizon.
The frequency of interaction determines the portfolio regret suffered by the client due to the robo-advisor not
having access to up-to-date information. We find that clients placing emphasis on investment performance
(i.e., low regret) are more suitable for robo-advising, while clients seeking “peace of mind” through a high
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level of delegation (i.e., low frequency of interaction), as well as clients with unstable risk preferences, are
less suitable for robo-advising.
Our model can be extended in several directions. First, the client’s risk aversion process in Section 3.1 can
be enhanced to include a component that captures the overall state of the economy. This is consistent with
empirical studies documenting that individuals are willing to take substantially larger risks during periods
of economic growth, and are more risk averse during periods of recession (Buccioli and Miniaci [2011], Sahm
[2012]). Second, the risk aversion process can be allowed to depend on market returns, with risk aversion
going down in market upswings and going up in market downturns, which is also consistent with empirical
evidence. This would generate a constraint on the frequency of communication between the client and the
robo-advisor. With risk aversion being affected by portfolio performance, such a constraint is needed to
prevent market timing (i.e., buying high/selling low) of clients whose risk aversion is highly sensitive to
short-term market swings.
The model for the market dynamics in Section 3.3 can be extended to be time-dependent or even having
stochastic volatility. It can also naturally be extended to include multiple tradable assets. Furthermore, the
portfolio rebalancing times in the investment model of Section 3.4 can be allowed to be random. For instance,
rebalancing could be triggered by the portfolio composition having drifted too much from the optimal
composition, given the client’s risk aversion level. Robo-advisors generally use such threshold updating rules
for rebalancing their portfolios (see Kaya [2017]), and this mirrors how a target regret threshold was used to
trigger a communication of the client’s risk preferences (see Section 6.1), with regret defined in terms of the
expected change in portfolio composition.
Our framework captures the nature of the investment process between a client and a robo-advisor.
However, there is an important tradeoff faced by clients when choosing the type of financial advisor. On the
one hand, robo-advisors charge significantly lower fees than traditional “human” financial advisors, which
negatively impacts the relative investment performance of the latter. On the other hand, robo-advisors
(i.e, “machines”) can be perceived to be less trustworthy than human financial advisors. Indeed, Rossi and
Utkus [2019b] show empirically that algorithmic aversion, i.e., the tendency of clients to more quickly lose
confidence in an algorithm than a human after observing them make the same mistake (Dietvorst et al.
[2015]), is one of the obstacles for investing through a robo-advisor, even though algorithm aversion is much
smaller among younger generations. We leave for future research the study of this tradeoff between a lower
fee structure and algorithmic aversion.
A Technical Lemmas
Lemma A.1 contains results related to the client’s risk aversion process, introduced in Section 3.1. Recall
that at time n ≥ 0 the client’s stochastic risk aversion is denoted by γ˘n ∈ R, while γn ∈ Γ is the risk aversion
level observed by the robo-advisor (see (3.1)-(3.2)). At updating times we have γn = Ψ(γ˘n), but otherwise
Ψ(γ˘n) ∈ Γ is the unobserved risk aversion level that would be observed by the robo-advisor following an
update at time n.
Assume now that at time n the previous communication of risk preferences took place at time τ ≤ n,
and resulted in risk aversion level γ ∈ Γ. Then, from the robo-advisor’s point of view, the distribution of
Ψ(γ˘n) is characterized by the probabilities
pn(γ
′; γ, τ) := P(Ψ(γ˘n) = γ′|γn = γ, τn = τ), γ′ ∈ Γ, (A.1)
which are given in closed form in Lemma A.1-(a), and for τ = 0 we let
pn(γ
′; γ) := pn(γ′; γ, 0), γ′ ∈ Γ. (A.2)
The expected absolute change in the client’s risk aversion level, since the previous updating time, is then
given by
µn(γ, τ) := E[|Ψ(γ˘n)− γτ ||γn = γ, τn = τ ], (A.3)
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which is provided in closed form in Lemma A.1-(b), along with µn(γ), defined in (5.6), which is equal to
µn(γ, τ) with τ = 0. Similarly to (A.3), we define µ
c
n(γ, τ) to be the expected absolute change without
projecting the client’s risk aversion to the nearest level in the set Γ,
µcn(γ, τ) := E[|γ˘n − γn||γn = γ, τn = τ ], (A.4)
which is given in Lemma A.1-(c), and so is µcn(γ), defined in (5.7), which is equal to µ
c
n(γ, τ) with τ = 0.
In Lemma A.1-(d) we provide a closed form expression for δn(γ, τ), defined in (3.9), which is equal to the
conditional standard deviation of Ψ(γ˘n), as well as the standard deviation
δn(γ) := δn(γ, 0). (A.5)
Finally, parts (e) and (f) of Lemma A.1 show that the sequence of risk aversion levels communicated by the
client to the robo-advisor form a time-homogeneous Markov chain on the set of risk aversion levels, Γ.
Lemma A.1.
(a) Let n ≥ 0, τ ≤ n, and γ, γ′ ∈ Γ. The probabilities pn(γ′; γ, τ) and pn(γ′; γ), defined in (A.1)-(A.2),
satisfy
pn(γ
′; γ, τ) = pn−τ (γ′; γ) =
{
1{γ′=γ}, τ = n,
Φ
(
(γ′)+−γ
σγ
√
n−τ
)
− Φ
(
(γ′)−−γ
σγ
√
n−τ
)
, τ ≤ n, (A.6)
where the constants (γ′)± are defined in (3.3), and Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution
function. Furthermore, the probability pn(γ; γ) is decreasing in n ≥ 0, and, for a fixed n ≥ 1, it is also
decreasing in σγ . Moreover, for n ≥ 1,
lim
n→∞ pn(γ
′; γ) = lim
σγ′→∞
pn(γ
′; γ) =
{
0, γ′ /∈ {γ¯1, γ¯K},
1/2, γ′ ∈ {γ¯1, γ¯K}.
(b) Let n ≥ 0, τ ≤ n, and γ ∈ Γ. The expected values µn(γ, τ) and µn(γ), defined respectively in (A.3)
and (5.6), satisfy
µn(γ, τ) = µn−τ (γ) =
∑
γ′∈Γ
pn−τ (γ′; γ)|γ′ − γ|, (A.7)
where pn−τ (γ′; γ) is given in (A.6). Furthermore, µn(γ) is increasing in n ≥ 0, and, for a fixed n ≥ 1,
it is also increasing in σγ . Moreover, for n ≥ 1,
lim
n→∞µn(γ) = limσγ→∞
µn(γ) =
γ¯1 + γ¯K
2
.
(c) Let n ≥ 0, τ ≤ n, and γ ∈ Γ. The expected values µcn(γ, τ) and µcn(γ), defined respectively in (A.4)
and (5.7), satisfy
µcn(γ, τ) = µ
c
n−τ (γ) =
√
2
pi
σγ
√
n− τ .
Furthermore, µcn(γ) is increasing in n ≥ 0, and µn(γ) ≤ µcn(γ), where µn(γ) is given in (A.7), with
the inequality being strict for n > 0.
(d) Let n ≥ 0, τ ≤ n, and γ ∈ Γ. The conditional standard deviations δn(γ, τ) and δn(γ), defined in (3.9)
and (A.5), respectively, satisfy
δn(γ, τ) = δn−τ (γ) =
√∑
γ′∈Γ
pn−τ (γ′; γ)(γ′)2 −
( ∑
γ′∈Γ
pn−τ (γ′; γ)γ′
)2
,
where pn−τ (γ′; γ) is given in (A.6). Furthermore, δ0(γ) = 0, and
lim
n→∞ δn(γ) =
(γ¯K − γ¯1)2
4
.
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(e) For any updating rule φ, the process (γ
T
(φ)
k
)k≥0 is an irreducible and aperiodic Markov chain on Γ,
with respect to the filtration (Gk)k≥0, where Gk := FT (φ)k . It has a time-homogeneous transition matrix
Λ(φ), given by
Λ
(φ)
γ′,γ = pφ(γ′)(γ; γ
′), γ, γ′ ∈ Γ,
with pφ(γ′)(γ; γ
′) given in closed form in (A.6).
(f) If φ ≡ 1, the process (γn)n≥0 is an irreducible and aperiodic Markov chain on Γ, with respect to the
filtration (Fn)n≥0, with a time-homogeneous transition matrix Λ, given by
Λγ′,γ = p1(γ; γ
′), γ, γ′ ∈ Γ, (A.8)
with p1(γ; γ
′) given in closed form in (A.6). Furthermore, it has a unique stationary distribution,
λ := (λ(γ))γ∈Γ, such that for γ, γ′ ∈ Γ,
λ(γ) = lim
n→∞Λ
n
γ′,γ .
Proof: To show the first equality in (a), we use the (conditional) time-homogeneity of the process (γ˘n)n≥0
to write
pn(γ
′; γ, τ) = P(Ψ(γ˘n) = γ′|γn = γ, τn = τ), γ′ ∈ Γ,= P(Ψ(γ˘n−τ ) = γ′|γn−τ = γ, τn−τ = 0) = pn−τ (γ′; γ).
To show the second equality, we have from the dynamics (3.1),
pn(γ
′; γ) = P(Ψ(γ˘n) = γ′|γ0 = γ, τn = 0)
= P(γ + σγ(Z˘1 + Z˘2 + · · ·+ Z˘n) ∈ ((γ′)−, (γ′)+))
= Φ
( (γ′)+ − γ
σγ
√
n
)
− Φ
( (γ′)− − γ
σγ
√
n
)
,
where we used that Z˘1 + Z˘2 + · · · + Zn ∼ N (0, n). If γ′ = γ, then pn(γ; γ) is decreasing in n and σγ
as γ+ − γ > 0 and γ− − γ < 0. Then, the limits follow from the fact that 0 < (γ′)+ − γ < ∞ and
−∞ < (γ′)−−γ < 0, unless γ′ = γ¯K in which case (γ′)+−γ =∞, or γ′ = γ¯1, in which case (γ′)−−γ = −∞.
In part (b), the first equality follows by (conditional) time-homogeneity, as the first inequality in (a), and the
second equality follows by definition. The limits follow from part (a). To show the monotonicity properties
of µn(γ), it is sufficient to notice that, for any c > 0, the probabilities
P(γ˘n > γ0 + c|γ0 = γ, τn = 0) = P
(
Z >
c/σγ√
n
)
, P(γ˘n < γ0 − c|γ0 = γ, τn = 0) = P
(
Z < −c/σγ√
n
)
,
are increasing in n ≥ 0 and σγ > 0. In part (c), the first equality follows by (conditional) time-homogeneity,
as the first inequality in (a). For the second equality, we again use that Z˘1 + Z˘2 + · · · + Z˘n ∼ N (0, n) to
write
µcn(γ) = E[|γ0 + σγ(Z˘1 + Z˘2 + · · ·+ Z˘n)− γ0|] = σγ
√
nE[|Z|] =
√
2
pi
σγ
√
n,
where we also used the absolute moment formula for the Gaussian distribution. It is clear that µcn(γ) is
increasing in n. To show the inequality, we denote by fγ˘n the probability density function of γ˘n, given γ0 = γ
and τn = 0, and let γ¯0 = γ¯
+
0 = −∞, and γ¯+K = γ¯K+1 =∞. We then have
µn(γ) =
K∑
k=0
[ ∫ γ¯+k
γ¯k
fγ˘n(γ
′)dγ′|γ¯k − γ0|+
∫ γ¯k+1
γ¯+k
fγ˘n(γ
′)dγ′|γ¯k+1 − γ0|
]
≤
K∑
k=0
[ ∫ γ¯+k
γ¯k
fγ˘n(γ
′)|γ′ − γ0|dγ′ +
∫ γ¯k+1
γ¯+k
fγ˘n(γ
′)|γ′ − γ0|dγ′
]
= µcn(γ).
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In part (d), the first equality follows by (conditional) time-homogeneity, as the first inequality in (a), and
the second equality follows by definition. The limit follows from part (a). To show (e), recall from (3.4) that
T
(φ)
k+1 = T
(φ)
k + φ(γ
(φ)
k ). In turn, using (a) yields
P(φ)
T
(φ)
k
(γ
T
(φ)
k+1
= γ|γ
T
(φ)
k
= γ′) = P(φ)
T
(φ)
k
(γ
T
(φ)
k +φ(γ
(φ)
k )
= γ|γ(φ)k = γ′)
= p
T
(φ)
k +φ(γ
(φ)
k )
(γ; γ′, T (φ)k )
= pφ(γ′)(γ; γ
′).
Therefore, the transition probabilities are time-homogeneous. We easily deduce that the Markov chain is
irreducible and aperiodic as the random walk (γ˘n)n≥0 has Gaussian increments. Part (f) follows as a special
case of part (e), and by the fact that every irreducible and aperiodic Markov chain with a finite state space
has a unique stationary distribution.
Lemma A.2 yields properties of the optimal portfolio strategy in Section 4. Recall that pi∗n,T (γ, τ, θ)
denotes the optimal proportion of wealth allocated to the risky asset at time n ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T − 1}, with
γ ∈ Γ representing the most recent risk aversion level, communicated at time τ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}. If φ ≡ 1, the
optimal allocation is denoted by pi∗n,T (γ, n), and if φ ≡ ∞, it is denoted by pi∗n,T (γ, θ).
Lemma A.2.
(a) The optimal final period allocation (at time n = T − 1) is given by
pi∗T−1,T (γ, τ, θ) =
1
∆T−1(γ, τ, θ)
µ− r
σ2
,
i.e., it is equal to the expected excess return of the risky asset, per unit of variance, with the variance
scaled by the risk-return tradeoff coefficient in (3.10).
(b) The optimal allocation at time n ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T −1} depends only on the time elapsed since the previous
update, n− τ , and the time until the end of the investment horizon, T − n. That is,
pi∗n,T (γ, τ, θ) = pi
∗
n−τ,T−τ (γ, 0, θ).
Furthermore, if φ ≡ ∞ and θ = 0, then
pi∗n,T (γ; 0) = pi
∗
0,T−n(γ; 0),
and, if φ ≡ 1, then,
pi∗n,T (γ, n) = pi
∗
0,T−n(γ, 0).
(c) Let θ = 0. Then, the optimal allocation is increasing between updating times and increasing up to a
O(·) term at updating times. Specifically, for n ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T − 2},
pi∗n,T (γ, τ ; 0) ≤ pi∗n+1,T (γ, τn+1; 0) +O(1− pτn+1(γ; γ, τ)),
with pτn+1(γ; γ, τ) given in Lemma A.1-(a). In particular, if φ ≡ ∞, then
pi∗n,T (γ; 0) ≤ pi∗n+1,T (γ; 0),
while, if φ ≡ 1, then
pi∗n,T (γ, n) ≤ pi∗n+1,T (γ, n+ 1) +O(1− Λγ,γ),
with Λγ,γ given in (A.8).
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(d) Let θ = 0. Then, for any 0 ≤ τ < T − φ(γ), the optimal allocation corresponding to the updating rule
φ and the optimal allocation corresponding to the no-updating rule, satisfy
pi∗n,T (γ, τ ; 0) = pi
∗
n,T (γ; 0) +O(1− pφ(γ)(γ; γ)), τ ≤ n < τ + φ(γ).
For T − φ(γ) ≤ τ < T , the two allocations coincide,
pi∗n,T (γ, τ ; 0) = pi
∗
n,T (γ; 0), τ ≤ n < T.
(e) For n = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1, the optimal allocations corresponding to the updating rule φ ≡ ∞ satisfy
pi∗n,T (γ; 0) = cn,T (γ)pi
∗
T−1,T (γ; 0),
where cn,T (γ) is increasing in γ and cT−1,T (γ) = 1.
Proof: Part (a) follows directly from the optimal allocation formula (4.1) and using that aT = bT = 1.
Part (b) follows by showing inductively that pi∗T−k,T (γ, τ, θ) = pi
∗
T−k−τ,T−τ (γ, 0, θ), for k = 1, 2, . . . , T − n,
where the case k = 1 follows from part (a). Next, we show part (c) for φ ≡ 1. In this case, we have
an+1(γn) = E(1)n+1,γn [an+2](R+ µ¯pi
∗
n+1,T (γn, n+ 1)),
bn+1(γn) = E(1)n+1,γn [bn+2](σ
2(pi∗n+1,T (γn, n+ 1))
2 + (R+ µ¯pi∗n+1,T (γn, n+ 1))
2)
≥ E(1)n+1,γn [bn+2](R+ µ¯pi∗n+1,T (γn, n+ 1))2,
(A.9)
where En+1,γn [an+2] is shorthand notation for En+1[an+2(γn+2)|γn+1 = γn], and En+1,γn [bn+2] is shorthand
notation for En+1[bn+2(γn+2)|γn+1 = γn]. We then write
pi∗n,T (γn, n)
=
µ¯/σ2
γn
an+1(γn)−Rγn(bn+1(γn)− a2n+1(γn))
bn+1(γn) + (
µ¯
σ )
2(bn+1(γn)− a2n+1(γn))
+Rn(γn)
≤ µ¯/σ
2
γn(R+ µ¯pi∗n+1(γn, n+ 1))
E(1)n+1,γn [an+2]−Rγn(R+ µ¯pi∗n+1(γn, n+ 1))(E
(1)
n+1,γn
[bn+2]− (E(1)n+1,γn [an+2])2)
E(1)n+1,γn [bn+2] + (
µ¯
σ )
2(E(1)n+1,γn [bn+2]− (E
(1)
n+1,γn
[an+2])2)
+Rn(γn)
≤ pi∗n+1,T (γn, n+ 1) +Rn(γn),
where Rn(γn) = O(1 − Λγn,γn), the first inequality follows from (A.9), and the second inequality follows
from the definition of pi∗n+1,T (γn, n+ 1), and that R+ µ¯pi
∗
n+1(γn, n+ 1) ≥ 1. The equality above follows from
the definition of pi∗n,T (γn, n), and by using similar steps as those in (B.11). The result for φ =∞ is a special
case, and the general result is shown in a similar way.
In part (d), we first note that if τ ≥ T − φ(γ), then pi∗n,T (γ, τ ; 0) = pi∗n,T (γ; 0), for n ≥ τ . For τ ∈
{T − 2φ(γ), T − 2φ(γ) + 1, . . . , T − φ(γ)− 1}, we can then show recursively that, for n = τ + φ(γ)− 1, τ +
φ(γ)− 2, . . . , τ + 1, τ ,
pi∗n,T (γ, τ ; 0) = pi
∗
n,T (γ; 0) +O(1− pφ(γ)(γ; γ)),
an(γ, τ) = a
(∞)
n (γ) +O(1− pφ(γ)(γ; γ)),
bn(γ, τ) = b
(∞)
n (γ) +O(1− pφ(γ)(γ; γ)),
where the O(·) terms can be justified in the same way as in (B.11). Similarly, one can show the result for
τ < T − 2φ(γ) and n = τ + φ(γ)− 1, τ + φ(γ)− 2, . . . , τ + 1, τ . In part (e), the assertion follows trivially for
n = T − 1. For n = T − 2, we can explicitly compute pi∗n,T (γ; 0) and show that the result also holds. Next,
assume that cn,T (γ) is increasing in γ ≥ 0, for some 0 < n < T − 1. Then, using the recursive equations for
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the an- and bn-coefficients, we deduce that
cn−1,T (γ)
=
a
(∞)
n (γ)−Rγ(b(∞)n (γ)− (a(∞)n (γ))2)
b
(∞)
n (γ) +
(
µ¯
σ
)2
(b
(∞)
n (γ)− (a(∞)n (γ))2)
=
1
R+ µ¯pi∗n,T (γ; 0)
a
(∞)
n+1(γ)−Rγ(R+ µ¯pi∗n,T (γ; 0))(b(∞)n+1(γ)(
σ2(pi∗n,T (γ;0))
2
(R+µ¯pi∗n,T (γ;0))
2 + 1)− (a(∞)n+1(γ))2)
b
(∞)
n+1(γ)(
σ2(pi∗n,T (γ;0))
2
(R+µ¯pi∗n,T (γ;0))
2 + 1) +
(
µ¯
σ
)2
(b
(∞)
n+1(γ)(
σ2(pi∗n,T (γ;0))
2
(R+µ¯pi∗n,T (γ;0))
2 + 1)− (a(∞)n+1(γ))2)
.
We easily deduce that cn−1,T (γ) is increasing in γ, by using the assumption on cn,T (γ), and that pi∗n,T (γ; 0)
is decreasing in γ, and f(x) = x/(1 + x) is increasing in x, for x ≥ 0.
B Proofs of Results in Section 4
Proof of Proposition 4.1: We begin by deriving the HJB system of equations satisfied by any candidate
optimal control law for the objective function (3.7). Recall that P(φ)n (·) is shorthand notation for P(φ)(·|Fn),
and that X(n) = (Xk)0≤k≤n, with analogue identities for γ(n) and τ(n). Furthermore, given X(n), then
Xpi(n+1) = (X(n), X
pi
n+1), where X
pi
n+1 is obtained by applying the control pin to Xn at time n.
Proposition B.1. Assume that an optimal control law pi∗ for the objective function (3.7) exists. Then the
value function (3.12) satisfies
V
(φ)
n,T (X(n), γ(n), τ(n), θ) = sup
pi
{
E(φ)n [V
(φ)
n+1,T (X
pi
(n+1), γ(n+1), τ(n+1), θ)] (B.1)
−
(
E(φ)n [fn+1,n+1(Xpi(n+1), γ(n+1), τ(n+1);X
pi
n+1, γn+1, τn+1, θ)]− E(φ)n [fn+1,n(Xpi(n+1), γ(n+1), τ(n+1);Xn, γn, τn, θ)]
)
−
(
E(φ)n
[∆n+1
2
(gn+1(Xpi(n+1), γ(n+1), τ(n+1))
Xpin+1
)2]
− ∆n
2
(
E(φ)n
[gn+1(Xpi(n+1), γ(n+1), τ(n+1))
Xn
])2}
,
for 0 ≤ n < T , with the terminal condition
V
(φ)
T,T (X(T ), γ(T ), τ(T ), θ) = 0.
Herein, the function sequence (fn,k(X(n), γ(n), τ(n);x
′, γ′, τ ′, θ))0≤n≤T , for any x′ > 0, γ′ > 0, and τ ′ ≥ 0,
and any k = 0, 1, . . . , T , is determined by the recursion
fn,k(X(n), γ(n), τ(n);x
′, γ′, τ ′, θ) = E(φ)n [fn+1,k(Xpi
∗
(n+1), γ(n+1), τ(n+1);x
′, γ′, τ ′, θ)], 0 ≤ n < T,
fT,k(X(T ), γ(T ), τ(T );x
′, γ′, τ ′, θ) =
XT
x′
− 1− ∆k(γ
′, τ ′, θ)
2
(XT
x′
)2
,
while the function sequence (gn(X(n), γ(n), τ(n)))0≤n≤T is determined by the recursion
gn(X(n), γ(n), τ(n)) = E(φ)n [gn+1(Xpi
∗
(n+1), γ(n+1), τ(n+1))], 0 ≤ n < T,
gT (X(T ), γ(T ), τ(T )) = XT .
Furthermore, we have, for 0 ≤ n < T , the probabilistic interpretation,
fn,k(X(n), γ(n), τ(n);x
′, γ′, τ ′, θ) = E(φ)n
[Xpi∗T
x′
− 1− ∆k(γ
′, τ ′, θ)
2
(Xpi∗T
x′
)2]
,
gn(X(n), γ(n), τ(n)) = E(φ)n [Xpi
∗
T ].
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Proof of Proposition B.1: We begin by deriving the HJB system for the general problem
Jn,T (X(n), γ(n), τ(n), pi, θ) := En[Fn(Xn, γn, τn, XpiT , θ)] +Gn(Xn, γn, τn,En[XpiT ], θ), 0 ≤ n < T,
where, for simplicity, we drop the superscript (φ) from the notation. This system is given in Eqs. (B.6)-(B.7),
and Proposition B.1 is then a special case with
Fn(x, γ, τ, y, θ) =
y
x
− 1− ∆n(γ, τ, θ)
2
(y
x
)2
, Gn(x, γ, τ, y, θ) =
∆n(γ, τ, θ)
2
(y
x
)2
. (B.2)
The proof consists of two parts. First, we derive the recursive equation satisfied by the objective function for
any given control law pi. Then, we derive the system of equations necessarily satisfied by an optimal control
law pi∗.
Step 1: Recursion for Jn,T (X(n), γ(n), τ(n), pi, θ). For a given control law pi, we define the functions
fpin,k(x, γ, τ ;x
′, γ′, τ ′, θ) := En[Fk(x′, γ′, τ ′, XpiT , θ)|X(n) = x, γ(n) = γ, τ(n) = τ ],
gpin(x, γ, τ) := En[XpiT |X(n) = x, γ(n) = γ, τ(n) = τ ],
(B.3)
and write the objective function at time n+ 1 as
Jn+1,T (X(n+1), γ(n+1), τ(n+1), pi, θ) = En+1[Fn+1(Xn+1, γn+1, τn+1, XpiT , θ)] +Gn+1(Xn+1, γn+1, τn+1,En+1[XpiT ], θ)
= fpin+1,n+1(X(n+1), γ(n+1), τ(n+1);Xn+1, γn+1, τn+1, θ)
+Gn+1(Xn+1, γn+1, τn+1, g
pi
n+1(X(n+1), γ(n+1), τ(n+1)), θ).
Taking expectations with respect to time n information yields, with Xpi(n+1) = (X(n), X
pi
n+1),
En[Jn+1,T (Xpi(n+1), γ(n+1), τ(n+1), pi, θ)] = En[f
pi
n+1,n+1(X
pi
(n+1), γ(n+1), τ(n+1);X
pi
n+1, γn+1, τn+1, θ)]
+ En[Gn+1(Xpin+1, γn+1, τn+1, gpin+1(Xpi(n+1), γ(n+1), τ(n+1)), θ)].
Adding and subtracting Jn,T (X(n), γ(n), τ(n), pi, θ) then gives
En[Jn+1,T (Xpi(n+1), γ(n+1), τ(n+1), pi, θ)] = Jn,T (X(n), γ(n), τ(n), pi, θ)
+ En[fpin+1,n+1(Xpi(n+1), γ(n+1), τ(n+1);X
pi
n+1, γn+1, τn+1, θ)]− En[Fn(Xn, γn, τn, XpiT , θ)]
+ En[Gn+1(Xpin+1, γn+1, τn+1, gpin+1(Xpi(n+1), γ(n+1), τ(n+1)))]−Gn(Xn, γn, τn,En[XpiT ], θ).
By the law of iterated expectations we have
fpin,k(X(n), γ(n), τ(n);x
′, γ′, τ ′, θ) = En[fpin+1,k(Xpi(n+1), γ(n+1), τ(n+1);x
′, γ′, τ ′, θ)],
gpin(X(n), γ(n), τ(n)) = En[gpin+1(Xpi(n+1), γ(n+1), τ(n+1))].
(B.4)
Thus,
Jn,T (Xn, γ(n), τ(n), pi, θ) = En[Jn+1,T (Xpi(n+1), γ(n+1), τ(n+1), pi, θ)]
−
(
En[fpin+1,n+1(Xpi(n+1), γ(n+1), τ(n+1);X
pi
n+1, γn+1, τn+1, θ)]− En[fpin+1,n(Xpi(n+1), γ(n+1), τ(n+1);Xn, γn, τn, θ)]
)
−
(
En[Gn+1(Xpin+1, γn+1, τn+1, gpin+1(Xpi(n+1), γ(n+1), τ(n+1)), θ)]−Gn(Xn, γn, τn,En[gpin+1(Xpi(n+1), γ(n+1), τ(n+1))], θ)
)
.
Step 2: Recursion for Vn,T (X(n), γ(n), τ(n), θ). Assume that there exists an optimal strategy pi
∗, and consider
a strategy pi that coincides with pi∗ after time n, so pik(X(k), γ(k), τ(k), θ) = pi∗k(X(k), γ(k), τ(k), θ), for all
k = n+ 1, . . . , T − 1. By definition, we then have
Jn,T (X(n), γ(n), τ(n), pi
∗, θ) = Vn,T (X(n), γ(n), τ(n), θ),
Jn,T (X(n), γ(n), τ(n), pi, θ) ≤ Vn,T (X(n), γ(n), τ(n), θ).
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For the optimal strategy pi∗, we define
fn,k(x, γ, τ ;x
′, γ′, τ ′, θ) := fpi
∗
n,k(x, γ, τ ;x
′, γ′, τ ′, θ),
gn(x, γ, τ) := g
pi∗
n (x, γ, τ).
(B.5)
Then, since pi and pi∗ coincide after time n, we have
Jn+1,T (X(n+1), γ(n+1), τ(n+1), pi, θ) = Vn+1,T (X(n+1), γ(n+1), τ(n+1), θ),
fn+1,k(X(n+1), γ(n+1), τ(n+1);x
′, γ′, τ ′, θ) = fpin+1,k(X(n+1), γ(n+1), τ(n+1);x
′, γ′, τ ′, θ),
gn+1(X(n+1), γ(n+1), τ(n+1)) = g
pi
n+1(X(n+1), γ(n+1), τ(n+1)).
In turn, using the recursion for Jn,T (X(n), γ(n), τ(n), pi, θ), we may write
Vn,T (X(n), γ(n), τ(n), θ) = sup
pi
{
En[Vn+1,T (Xpi(n+1), γ(n+1), τ(n+1), θ)] (B.6)
−
(
En[fn+1,n+1(Xpi(n+1), γ(n+1), τ(n+1);X
pi
n+1, γn+1, τn+1, θ)]− En[fn+1,n(Xpi(n+1), γ(n+1), τ(n+1);Xn, γn, τn, θ)]
)
−
(
En[Gn+1(Xpin+1, γn+1, τn+1, gn+1(Xpi(n+1), γ(n+1), τ(n+1)), θ)]−Gn(Xn, γn, τn,En[gn+1(Xpi(n+1), γ(n+1), τ(n+1))], θ)
)}
,
with terminal condition
VT,T (X(T ), γ(T ), τ(T ), θ) = FT (XT , γT , XT , θ) +GT (XT , γT , XT , θ).
From (B.3), (B.4), and (B.5), we have that, for any x′ > 0, γ′ > 0, and τ ′ ≥ 0, and any k = 0, 1, . . . , T , the
function sequence (fn,k(X(n), γ(n), τ(n);x
′, γ′, τ ′, θ))0≤n≤T is determined by the recursion
fn,k(X(n), γ(n), τ(n);x
′, γ′, τ ′, θ) = En[fn+1,k(Xpi
∗
(n+1), γ(n+1), τ(n+1);x
′, γ′, τ ′, θ)], n = 0, . . . , T − 1,
fT (X(T ), γ(T ), τ(T );x
′, γ′, τ ′, θ) = Fn(x′, γ′, τ ′, XT , θ).
Furthermore, the function sequence (gn(X(n), γ(n), τ(n)))0≤n≤T is determined by the recursion
gn(X(n), γ(n), τ(n)) = En[gn+1(Xpi
∗
(n+1), γ(n+1), τ(n+1))], n = 0, . . . , T − 1,
gT (X(T ), γ(T ), τ(T )) = XT .
(B.7)
We also have, for 0 ≤ n ≤ T , the probabilistic representation
fn,k(X(n), γ(n), τ(n);x
′, γ′, τ ′, θ) = En[Fk(x′, γ′, τ ′, Xpi
∗
T , θ)], gn(X(n), γ(n), τ(n)) = En[Xpi
∗
T ].
We easily conclude.
Proof of Proposition 4.1: Assuming the existence of an optimal control law pi∗, the value function at time
n+ 1 satisfies
Vn+1,T (X(n+1), γ(n+1), τ(n+1), θ)
= fn+1,n+1(X(n+1), γ(n+1), τ(n+1);Xn+1, γn+1, τn+1, θ) +
∆n+1
2
(g2n+1(X(n+1), γ(n+1), τ(n+1))
Xn+1
)2
,
and plugging this into the HJB equation (B.1) gives
Vn,T (X(n), γ(n), τ(n), θ)
= sup
pi
{
En[fn+1,n(Xpi(n+1), γ(n+1), τ(n+1);Xn, γn, τn, θ)] +
∆n
2
(En[gn+1(Xpi(n+1), γ(n+1), τ(n+1))]
Xn
)2}
.
(B.8)
Next, we look for a candidate optimal policy of the form
pin = pin(X(n), γ(n), τ(n), θ) = pin(Xn, γn, τn, θ) = pin(γn, τn, θ)Xn.
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For such a policy, we use the wealth dynamics (3.6) to show that (see Appendix B)
En[XpiT ] = an(γn, τn)Xn, En[(XpiT )2] = bn(γn, τn)X2n, (B.9)
where the an- and bn-coefficients are pi-dependent and satisfy the recursions
an(γn, τn) = (R+ µ¯pin(γn, τn, θ))En[an+1(γn+1, τn+1)],
bn(γn, τn) = (σ
2pi2n(γn, τn, θ) + (R+ µ¯pin(γn, τn, θ))
2)En[bn+1(γn+1, τn+1)].
(B.10)
From (B.2), (B.3), and (B.5), it then follows that for an optimal policy, we have
fn,k(X(n), γ(n), τ(n);x
′, γ′, τ ′, θ) = an(γn, τn)
Xn
x′
− 1− ∆k(γ
′, τ ′, θ)
2
bn(γn, τn)
(Xn
x′
)2
,
gn(X(n), γ(n), τ(n)) = an(γn, τn)Xn.
Plugging this into (B.8), using (3.6), and eliminating the arguments from an+1, bn+1, and pin, gives
Vn,T (X(n), γ(n), τ(n), θ)
= sup
pi
{
En
[
an+1
Xpin+1
Xn
− 1− ∆n
2
bn+1
(Xpin+1
Xn
)2]
+
∆n
2
(
En
[
an+1
Xpin+1
Xn
])2}
= sup
pi
{
En
[
an+1(RXn + Zn+1pin)− 1− ∆n
2
bn+1(RXn + Zn+1pin)
2
]
+
∆n
2
(
En[an+1(RXn + Zn+1pin)]
)2}
.
Recalling that Zn+1 has mean µ¯ and variance σ
2 gives
Vn,T (X(n), γ(n), τ(n), θ) = sup
pi
{
En[an+1](RXn + µ¯pin)− 1− 1
2
∆n
Xn
En[bn+1](R2X2n + 2RXnµ¯pin + (µ¯2 + σ2)pi2n)
+
1
2
∆n
Xn
(En[an+1])2(R2X2n + 2Rµ¯pin + µ¯2pi2n)]
}
.
This can be rewritten as
Vn,T (X(n), γ(n), τ(n), θ) = sup
pi
{
µ¯
[
En[an+1]−R∆n(En[bn+1]− (En[an+1])2)
]
pin
− 1
2
∆n
Xn
[
En[bn+1](σ2 + µ¯2)− (En[an+1])2µ¯2
]
pi2n
− 1 +RXn
[
En[an+1]− ∆n
2
En[an+1]R+
∆n
2
(En[an+1])2R
]}
,
and taking the derivative with respect to pin gives the optimal allocation (4.3). One can then easily check
that the HJB equation (B.1) is satisfied by this solution.
Proof of (B.9)-(B.10): For n = T − 1, we have by (3.6), that
ET−1
[ XpiT
XT−1
]
= ET−1[R+ ZTpiT−1(γT−1, τT−1)] = R+ µ¯piT−1(γT−1, τT−1) =: aT−1(γT−1, τT−1).
Next, let n ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T − 2} and assume that the result holds for n+ 1, n+ 2, . . . , T − 1. Then,
En
[XpiT
Xn
]
= En
[
(R+ Zn+1pin(γn, τn))
T−1∏
k=n+1
(R+ Zk+1pik(γk, τk))
]
= (R+ µ¯pin(γn, τn))En
[ T−1∏
k=n+1
(R+ Zk+1pik(γk, τk))
]
= (R+ µ¯pin(γn, τn))En[an+1(γn+1, τn+1)]
=: an(γn, τn).
The result for the bn-coefficients can be shown in the same way.
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Proof of Proposition 4.3: Part (a) follows from Proposition 4.1 with τn = n, for all n ≥ 0. Part (b)
follows from Proposition 4.1 with τn = 0, for all n ≥ 0.
Proof of (4.9)–(4.11): First, consider the case φ ≡ 1 and note that, for n = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1, there exist
constants Ka(n, T ) and Kb(n, T ) such that,
1 ≤ sup
γ∈Γ
an(γ) < Ka(n, T ) <∞, 1 ≤ sup
γ∈Γ
bn(γ) < Kb(n, T ) <∞.
Then, we can write
E(1)n [an+1(γn+1)] = Λγn,γnan+1(γn) +
∑
γ 6=γn
Λγn,γan+1(γ) =: an+1(γn) +Ra(γn),
E(1)n [bn+1(γn+1)] = Λγn,γnbn+1(γn) +
∑
γ 6=γn
Λγn,γbn+1(γ) =: bn+1(γn) +Rb(γn),
where
|Ra(γn)| ≤ 2Ka(n, T )(1− Λγn,γn) = O(1− Λγn,γn), |Rb(γn)| ≤ 2Kb(n, T )(1− Λγn,γn) = O(1− Λγn,γn).
Next, recall that the random variable Z is defined on the probability space (Ω,F ,P), independently of
(Zn)n≥1, but with the same distribution. Thus, Z ′ = Z/σ has mean µ¯/σ and unit variance. In turn,
(σ2 + µ¯2)bn+1(γn)− µ¯2a2n+1(γn) = E(1)n [Z2(1 + rpi
∗
n+1,T )
2|γn+1 = γn] + (E(1)n [Z(1 + rpi
∗
n+1,T )|γn+1 = γn])2
= σ2V ar(1)n [Z
′(1 + rpi
∗
n+1,T )|γn+1 = γn].
Using the above, we can write the optimal allocation in (4.5) as
pi∗n,T (γn, n) =
µ¯
γn
an+1(γn)−Rγn(bn+1(γn)− a2n+1(γn)) +O(1− Λγn,γn)
(σ2 + µ2)bn+1(γn)− µ2a2n+1(γn) +O(1− Λγn,γn)
(B.11)
=
µ¯/σ2
γn
E(1)n+1[1 + rpi
∗
n+1,T |γn+1 = γn]−RγnV ar(1)n+1[1 + rpi
∗
n+1,T |γn+1 = γn]
V ar
(1)
n+1[Z
′(1 + rpi∗n+1,T )|γn+1 = γn]
+O(1− Λγn,γn),
and (4.10) follows from Lemma A.1-(a) and (4.8), and by setting R = 1.
To justify the second equality above, we work as follows. First, for n = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1, there exists a
constant K(n, T ) <∞ such that
sup
γ∈Γ
|an+1(γ)−Rγ(bn+1(γ)− a2n+1(γ))| < K(n, T ) <∞.
Second, from the recursive equation (4.6), it follows that bn+1(γ) ≥ 1. Thus, by Jensen’s inequality,
bn+1(γ)(σ
2 + µ2)− a2n+1(γ)µ2 ≥ bn+1(γ)σ2 ≥ σ2 > 0, γ ∈ Γ.
Identity (4.9) is a special case of (4.10), and (4.11) can be shown in a similar way.
C Proofs of Results in Section 5 and Section 6
Proof of (5.3)–(5.4): Recall from (A.1) that pn(γ
′; γ, τ) is the probability of being at level γ′ at time
n, after level γ being realized at time τ , with no intermediate risk aversion updates. Then, we have from
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Lemma A.2-(d) that
R˜(φ)n,T (γ, τ) =
∑
γ′∈Γ
pn(γ
′; γ, τ)
|pi∗n,T (γ, τ ; 0)− pi∗n,T (γ′, n; 0)|
pi∗n,T (γ′, n; 0)
=
∑
γ′∈Γ
pn(γ
′; γ, τ)
( |pi∗n,T (γ; 0)− pi∗n,T (γ′; 0)|
pi∗n,T (γ′; 0)
+O(1− pφ(γ)(γ; γ)) +O(1− pφ(γ′)(γ′; γ′))
)
=
∑
γ′∈Γ
pn(γ
′; γ, τ)
|pi∗n,T (γ; 0)− pi∗n,T (γ′; 0)|
pi∗n,T (γ′; 0)
+O(1− pφ(γ)(γ; γ))
= E(φ)n
[ |pi∗n,T (γn; 0)− pi∗n,T (Ψ(γ˘n); 0)|
pi∗n,T (Ψ(γ˘n); 0)
∣∣∣γn = γ, τn = τ]+O(1− pφ(γ)(γ; γ)).
The second equality can be shown using similar arguments as those used to justify (B.11). For the third
equality we used that, for any γ′ ∈ Γ,
pn(γ
′; γ, τ) ≤ 1− pn(γ; γ, τ) = 1− pn−τ (γ; γ) ≤ 1− pφ(γ)(γ; γ),
which follows from Lemma A.1-(a) and n− τ < φ(γ). Next, we claim that for any 0 ≤ τ < T ,
sup
τ≤n<nτ
R˜(φ)n,T (γ, τ) = sup
τ≤n<nτ
E(φ)n
[ | cn,T (γ)cn,T (Ψ(γ˘n))pi∗T−1,T (γ; 0)− pi∗T−1,T (Ψ(γ˘n); 0)|
pi∗T−1,T (Ψ(γ˘n); 0)
∣∣∣γn = γ, τn = τ]+O(1− pφ(γ)(γ; γ))
≤ sup
τ≤n<nτ
E(φ)n
[ |pi∗T−1,T (γ; 0)− pi∗T−1,T (Ψ(γ˘n); 0)|
pi∗T−1,T (Ψ(γ˘n); 0)
∣∣∣γn = γ, τn = τ]+O(1− pφ(γ)(γ; γ))
= E(φ)n
[ |pi∗T−1,T (γ; 0)− pi∗T−1,T (Ψ(γ˘n); 0)|
pi∗T−1,T (Ψ(γ˘n); 0)
∣∣∣γn = γ, τn = τ]∣∣∣
n=nτ−1
+O(1− pφ(γ)(γ; γ))
≤ sup
τ≤n<T
R˜(φ)n,T (γ, τ)
∣∣∣
τ=(T−φ(γ))∨0
+O(1− pφ(γ)(γ; γ))
= R˜(φ)n,T (γ, τ)
∣∣∣
τ=(T−φ(γ))∨0, n=T−1
+O(1− pφ(γ)(γ; γ)).
(C.1)
Indeed, the first inequality follows from Lemma A.2-(e), because for γ < Ψ(γ˘n) we have cn,T (γ) ≤ cn,T (Ψ(γ˘n)),
which yields that
pi∗T−1,T (Ψ(γ˘n); 0) ≤
cn,T (γ)
cn,T (Ψ(γ˘n))
pi∗T−1,T (γ; 0) ≤ pi∗T−1,T (γ; 0),
with the inequalities reversing for γ > Ψ(γ˘n). The second equality in (C.1) follows from the fact that,
conditionally on γn = γ and τn = τ , we have γ˘n ∼ N (γ, (n − τ)σ2γ), and, thus P(φ)n (|Ψ(γ˘n)| > c) =
P(φ)τ (|Ψ(γ˘n)| > c) is increasing in n for all c > 0. From this fact, and the definition of R˜(φ)n,T (γ, τ), the second
inequality and third equality in (C.1) also follow. In turn, (5.3) and (5.4) follow from (C.1), and the fact
that the O(·) term vanishes, and the inequalities become equalities, for τ = (T − φ(γ)) ∨ 0.
Proof of Proposition 5.2: The inequality in part (a) follows from (5.3)-(5.4). To show (5.8), we use that
by Lemma A.2-(a),
R(φ)T (γ) = E(φ)n
[ |pi∗n,T (γn, τn; 0)− pi∗n,T (Ψ(γ˘n), n; 0)|
pi∗n,T (Ψ(γ˘n), n; 0)
∣∣∣γn = γ, τn = τ]∣∣∣
τ=(T−φ(γ))∨0, n=T−1
= E(φ)n
[ |Ψ(γ˘n)− γn|
γn
∣∣∣γn = γ, τn = τ]∣∣∣
τ=(T−φ(γ))∨0, n=T−1
.
The distribution of γ˘n under P(φ)n , given γn = γ and τn = τ , is the same as the distribution of γ˘n−τ under
P, given γ0 = γ. Hence, noting that n− τ = (φ(γ) ∧ T )− 1, for τ = (T − φ(γ)) ∨ 0 and n = T − 1, we have
R(φ)T (γ) = E
[ |Ψ(γ˘(φ(γ)∧T )−1)− γ0|
γ0
∣∣∣γ0 = γ] = µ(φ(γ)∧T )−1(γ)
γ
,
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where the second equality follows from the definition of µn in (5.6). In part (b), the monotonicity properties
and limits follow from Lemma A.1-(b). The inequality R(φ)T (γ) ≤ R(φ)T,c(γ) and the identity for R(φ)T,c(γ),
follow from Lemma A.1-(c).
Proof of Proposition 5.3: We have
S˜(φ)n,T (γ, τ, θ) =
|pi∗n,T (γ, τ, θ)− pi∗n,T (γ; 0)|
pi∗n,T (γ; 0)
+O(1− pφ(γ)(γ; γ))
=
|pi∗n,T (γ + θδn(γ, τ); 0)− pi∗n,T (γ; 0)|
pi∗n,T (γ; 0)
+O(θ(1− pφ(γ)(γ; γ))) +O(1− pφ(γ)(γ; γ))
=
|pi∗n,T (γ + θδn(γ, τ); 0)− pi∗n,T (γ; 0)|
pi∗n,T (γ; 0)
+O(θ(1− pφ(γ)(γ; γ)))
≤ |pi
∗
T−1,T (γ + θδn(γ, τ); 0)− pi∗T−1,T (γ; 0)|
pi∗T−1,T (γ; 0)
+O(θ(1− pφ(γ)(γ; γ)))
=
θδn(γ, τ)
γ + θδn(γ, τ)
+O(θ(1− pφ(γ)(γ; γ))).
(C.2)
The first equality above follows from Lemma A.1-(d) and similar steps as those used to establish (B.11).
For the second equality, first consider n ≥ τ where τ is such that τ + φ(γ) > T − 1. Then, we can show
recursively, for n′ = T − 1, T − 2, . . . , n, that
pi∗n′,T (γ, τ, θ) = pi
∗
n′,T (γ + θδn(γ, τ); 0) +O(θ(δn′(γ, τ)− δn(γ, τ))),
an′(γ, τ) = a
(∞)
n′ (γ + θδn(γ, τ)) +O(θ(δn′(γ, τ)− δn(γ, τ))),
bn′(γ, τ) = b
(∞)
n′ (γ + θδn(γ, τ)) +O(θ(δn′(γ, τ)− δn(γ, τ))).
Working backwards, we then show that for arbitrary n and τ , and n′ ≥ n, we have
pi∗n′,T (γ, τ, θ) = pi
∗
n′,T (γ + θδn(γ, τ); 0) +O(1− pφ(γ)(γ; γ)) +O(θ(δn′(γ, τn′)− δn(γ, τ))),
an′(γ, τ) = a
(∞)
n′ (γ + θδn(γ, τ)) +O(1− pφ(γ)(γ; γ)) +O(θ(δn′(γ, τn′)− δn(γ, τ))),
bn′(γ, τ) = b
(∞)
n′ (γ + θδn(γ, τ)) +O(1− pφ(γ)(γ; γ)) +O(θ(δn′(γ, τn′)− δn(γ, τ))),
where, at time n′, the probability 1− pφ(γ)(γ, γ) bounds the probability of the risk aversion level at the next
updating time, τ +φ(γ), being different from γ, and the O(1−pφ(γ)(γ; γ)) term thus arises from the realized
risk aversion level being random. Next, note that there exists a constant C <∞ such that
|δn′(γ, τn′)− δn(γ, τ)| ≤ C((1− pn−τ (γ)) + (1− pn′−τn′ (γ))) ≤ C(1− pφ(γ)(γ)).
This follows from Lemma A.1-(a) as n′ − τn′ ≤ φ(γ), and n − τ ≤ φ(γ). The second equality in (C.2) now
follows. The inequality in (C.2) follows from Lemma A.2-(e) in the same way as the first inequality in (C.1).
The last equality follows from Lemma A.2-(a).
Proof of (5.12): Using Ψ(γ˘n) ≈ γ˘n gives
θδn(γ) = θ
√
V ar[Ψ(γ˘n)|γn = γ, τn = 0] ≈ θ
√
V ar[γ˘n|γn = γ, τn = 0] = θσγ
√
n,
where the final equality follows from the fact that γ˘n ∼ N (γ, nσ2γ), conditionally on γn = γ and τn = 0.
Proof of (6.3)-(6.5): For (6.3), we use the approximation Ψ(γ) ≈ γ and Lemma A.1-(c) to write
R¯(φ)T =
∑
γ∈Γ
λ(γ)R(φ)T (γ) ≈
∑
γ∈Γ
λ(γ)R(φ)T,c(γ) =
∑
γ∈Γ
λ(γ)
√
2
pi
σγ
γ
√
φ(γ).
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We also have that
φ¯κ := inf{n ≥ 1 : R¯(φ)T
∣∣∣
φ≡n
> κ} ≈
⌈
κ2
pi
2
/(∑
γ∈Γ
λ(γ)
σγ
γ
)2⌉
≈ κ2pi
2
/(∑
γ∈Γ
λ(γ)
σγ
γ
)2
,
and by combining the above, (6.5) follows.
Proof of (6.6): By Lemma A.1-(a) we have
α
(φ)
T (γ) = sup
0≤n<T
P(φ)n (Ψ(γ˘n+φ(γ)) = γ|γn = γ, τn = n)1{n+φ(γ)<T}
= sup
0≤n<T
P(Ψ(γ˘n+φ(γ)) = γ|γn = γ, τn+φ(γ) = n)1{n+φ(γ)<T}
= sup
0≤n<T
pφ(γ)(γ; γ)1{n+φ(γ)<T}
= pφ(γ)(γ; γ)1{φ(γ)<T}.
Notice, again by Lemma A.1-(a), that α
(φ)
T (γ) is decreasing in φ(γ). Also, the probability of a false positive
is zero if φ(γ) ≥ T , as in this case, there will be no updates prior to the terminal date T . To show (6.6), we
first use Lemma A.1-(a) to write
α
(φκ)
T (γ) =
[
Φ
( γ+ − γ
σγ
√
φκ(γ)
)
− Φ
( γ− − γ
σγ
√
φκ(γ)
)]
1{φκ(γ)<T},
and we easily conclude using (6.4).
D Pseudocode for Optimal Investment Strategy
We provide a pseudocode for the backward recursion used to compute the optimal strategy in Proposition
4.1. The optimal strategies in Proposition 4.3 are then special cases. Specifically, for any updating rule φ,
and any θ ≥ 0, we compute
pi∗n,k,τ := pi
∗
n,T (γ¯k, τ, θ), an,k,τ := an(γ¯k, τ), bn,k,τ := bn(γ¯k, τ),
for 0 ≤ n ≤ T , 1 ≤ k ≤ K, and 0 ≤ τ ≤ n. Recall that R = 1 + r, where r ≥ 0 is the risk-free rate, µ¯ = µ− r
is the excess return of the risky asset and σ its volatility, and the transition probability pn(γ
′; γ), for any
γ, γ′ ∈ Γ, is given in (A.6). We use 1A to be the indicator function of A.
1. Set aT,k,τ = 1, bT,k,τ = 1, and pi
∗
T,k,τ = 0, for k = 1, 2, . . . ,K and τ = 0, 1, . . . , T .
2. For n = T − 1, T − 2, . . . , 0:
For k = 1, 2, . . . ,K:
For τ = n, n− 1, . . . , 0:
τn+1 = 1{τ+φ(γ¯k)>n+1} × τ + 1{τ+φ(γ¯k)≤n+1} × (n+ 1),
µa =
∑K
k′=1 pτn+1−τ (γ¯k′ ; γ¯k)an+1,k′,n+1,
µb =
∑K
k′=1 pτn+1−τ (γ¯k′ ; γ¯k)bn+1,k′,n+1,
δ =
∑K
k′=1 pn−τ (γ¯k′ ; γk)γ¯
2
k′ − (
∑K
k′=1 pn−τ (γ¯k′ ; γ)γ¯k′)
2,
pi∗n,k,τ =
µ¯
γ¯k+θδ
µa−R(γ¯k+θδ)(µb−µ2a)
(σ2+µ¯2)µb−µ¯2µ2a ,
an,k,τ = µa(R+ µ¯pi
∗
n,k,τ ),
bn,k,τ = µb(σ
2(pi∗n,k,τ )
2 + (R+ µ¯(pi∗n,k,τ )
2)2).
End
End
End
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